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Professor Rosa Liliana Matzkin, Co-Chair
Professor John William Asker, Co-Chair
My dissertation contributes to the structural nonparametric econometrics of auc-
tions and contests with incomplete information. It consists of three chapters.
The first chapter investigates the identification and estimation of an all-pay
auction where the object is allocated to the player with the highest bid, and
every bidder pays his bid regardless of whether he wins or not. As a baseline
model, I consider the setting, where one object is allocated among several risk-
neutral participants with independent private values (IPV); however, I also show
how the model can be extended to the multiunit case. Moreover, the model is
not confined to the IPV paradigm, and I further consider the case where the
bidders’ private values are affiliated (APV). In both IPV and APV settings, I
prove the identification and derive the consistent estimators of the distribution of
the bidders’ valuations using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et
al. (2000). Finally, I consider the model with risk-averse bidders. I prove that
in general the model in this set-up is not identified even in the semi-parametric
case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to the class
of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
The second chapter proves the identification and derives the asymptotically
ii
normal estimator of a nonparametric contest of incomplete information with un-
certainty. By uncertainty, I mean that the contest success function is not only
determined by the bids of the players, but also by the variable, which I call uncer-
tainty, with a nonparametric distribution, unknown to the researcher, but known
to the bidders. This work is the first to consider the incomplete information con-
test with a nonparametric contest success function. The limiting case of the model
when there is no uncertainty is an all-pay auction considered in the first chapter.
The model with two asymmetric players is examined. First, I recover the distri-
bution of uncertainty using the information on win outcomes and bids. Next, I
adopt the structural approach of Guerre et al. (2000) to obtain the distribution of
the bidders’ valuations (or types). As an empirical application, I study the U.S.
House of Representatives elections. The model provides a method to disentangle
two sources of incumbency advantage: a better reputation, and better campaign
financing. The former is characterized by the distribution of uncertainty and the
latter by the difference in the distributions of candidates’ types. Besides, two
counterfactual analyses are performed: I show that the limiting expenditure dom-
inates public campaign financing in terms of lowering total campaign spending as
well as the incumbent’s winning probability.
The third chapter is a semiparametric version of the second chapter. In the
case when the data is sparse, some restrictions on the nonparametric structure
need to be put. In this work, I prove the identification and derive the consistent
estimator of a contest of incomplete information, in which an object is allocated
according to the serial contest success function. As in previous chapters, I recover
the distribution of the bidders’ valuations from the data on observed bids using
a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000) and He and Huang
(2018). As a baseline model, I consider the symmetric contest. Further, the model
is extended to account for the bidders’ asymmetry.
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CHAPTER 1
Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of
All-Pay Auctions
1.1 Introduction
Nonparametric analysis of auction data is a widely discussed topic. For an exten-
sive review see Athey and A. Haile (2007). The contribution of this paper is the
identification and estimation of an all-pay auction. The object is allocated to the
player with the highest bid, and every bidder pays his bid regardless of whether
he wins or not. There are several reasons why the examining of this auction for-
mat is of interest. First, the underlying structural model is used to describe the
players’ behavior in many scenarios, in which the assumption that only the person
who wins needs to pay his bid (as in case of the first-price auction) seems to be
restrictive. For instance, the all-pay auction has been used to model elections,
different kinds of contests and sports events, research and development as well as
rent-seeking activity, such as lobbying (see Baye et al. (1993)). The other reason
for considering this auction format is that as theoretical (see Krishna and Mor-
gan (1997)) and experimental (see Noussair and Silver (2006)) results indicate,
it raises greater revenue than the first-price auction and thus is good from the
seller’s perspective, although it is rarely used in real-world situations.
In this work, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimator of
an all-pay auction. I find the distribution of the bidders’ valuations from the data
on bids using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000). As a
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baseline model, I consider the setting where one object is allocated among several
risk-neutral participants with independent private values (IPV). However, I also
show how the model can be extended to the setting where M > 1 objects are
distributed through the auction (see Barut et al. (2002) for the same set-up).
Moreover, the model is not confined to the IPV paradigm and can account
for the case in which the bidders’ private values are affiliated (APV). Laffont and
Vuong (1996) show that “for any given level of competition any symmetric AV
(affiliated values) model is observationally equivalent in terms of bids to some
symmetric APV model”. Thus, any CV (common values) model is equivalent
observationally to some APV model while IPV setting is a particular case of the
APV, making the APV setting the most general.
The estimation procedure (similar to that of Li et al. (2002)) makes it possible
to obtain the joint distribution of private valuations from the observed bids. This
distribution provides information to test the IPV assumption and to consider
different policy interventions.
Finally, I consider the model with risk-averse bidders. As experimental studies
of all-pay auctions show (see Fibich et al. (2006) and Barut et al. (2002)) the
bidder’s behavior is consistent with the risk-averse utility function. However, I
prove that in general the model in this set-up is not identified even in the semi-
parametric case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to
the class of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce notations
and definitions used throughout the paper. Section 3 discusses the identification
and estimation as well as the Monte Carlo simulations of the IPV model. Section 4
considers the APV setting. Similarly, identification analysis, estimation procedure
as well as the Monte Carlo simulations are presented. Section 5 discusses the IPV
setting with risk-averse bidders and proves the nonidentification result. Section 6
concludes.
2
1.2 Notations and Definitions
In this work, an all-pay auction model with N symmetric bidders is considered.
Every bidder observes some private information with cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) F ∈ F . Let G denote the set of all possible distributions of bids. Let
us call the mapping from the private information to bids γ ∈ Γ, where γ : F → G.
Nonparametric identification means that the econometrician can recover the
distribution of private information from the observed bids. Formally,
Definition 1.1. (Identification). A model (F ,Γ) is identified if for every (F, F ′) ∈
F2 and (γ, γ′) ∈ Γ2 , γ(F ) = γ′(F ′)⇒ (F, γ) = (F ′, γ′).
There exist various specifications of the auctions models. The setting where
each bidder observes his valuation of the good but not the values of the rest of
the players is called the private value model. In contrast, when all bidders receive
correlated signals about the value, the common values model is considered. Other
dimensions are whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric and whether
bidders’ information is independent or affiliated (see Athey and Haile (2002)).
Let us denote by vi the bidder i’s private information (or type), v = (v1, ..., vN).
N is the number of (potential) bidders. The payoff of each bidder if he obtains one
unit is represented by Ui = u(vi, V ), where V is the common payoff component.
It is further assumed that the utility function u(·) is continuous, non-negative,
increasing in each argument, and common across bidders. Bidders might be risk-
neutral or risk-averse. Here F denotes the joint cumulative distribution function of
(v1, ..., vN , V ). This function is assumed to be symmetric in vi (exchangeability).
F,N and u are common knowledge. Thus bidders play the game of incomplete
information.
Definition 1.2. Bidders have private values if
E[u(vi, V )|(v1, ..., vN)] = E[u(vi, V )|vi] ∀v−i, Ui
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In the private values setting we can distinguish between two cases, namely
independent and affiliated values.
Definition 1.3. The private values are independent if
fvi,vj = fvifvj ,
where f(·) is the marginal distribution of the private signal.
Based on Milgrom and Weber (1982) the affiliation means the following:
Definition 1.4. For variables with densities it is said that they are affiliated if
for all v and vˆ
f(v ∨ vˆ)f(v ∧ vˆ) ≥ f(v)f(vˆ),
where ∨ denotes the component-wise maximum and ∧ denotes the component-wise
minimum.
Affiliation means, that the bigger is the realization of one’s value, the more
likely it is that the other’s value is also big.
1.3 IPV All-Pay Auction with Risk-Neutral Bidders
1.3.1 Model
I first focus on the IPV environment with N risk-neutral players and M identical
goods. In this case:
Assumption 1.1. u(vi) = vi, i = 1, ..., N .
Assumption 1.2. Each bidder draws a value vi independently from a commonly
known distribution F (v) with support [v, v¯].
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All the bidders are ex-ante symmetric. Here vi is the private value for bidder
i of possessing the good.
Assumption 1.3. The bidders submit the bids bi simultaneously knowing N , M ,
vi and F (v).
Thus the distribution function F (·) is a common knowledge, while the val-
uations of other players are not observed, which makes the setting a game of
incomplete information.
Assumption 1.4. Each of N bidders pays bi, regardless of whether or not he
obtains a good.
Assumption 1.5. N bids are ordered from highest to lowest and all M highest
bidders receive a good. If there is a tie for the M-th object, a lottery takes place
and each of the bidders gets the object with equal probability.
Therefore the bidder i’s resulting payoff is vi− bi if he obtains a good, and −bi
otherwise. In expectation then the payoff to bidder i is:
E[Ui|vi, v−i] = viP [win|bi, N,M, F (v)]− bi
where P [win|bi, N,M, F (v)] is the probability that bi is one of the M highest bids.
Following the literature, I consider the Bayesian equilibrium of this incomplete
information game, which is strictly monotonic and symmetric (the existence can be
proved as in Krishna and Morgan (1997)). For each valuation the corresponding
bid is defined by the function s(v) = b. Since s(v) is strictly monotonic it is
invertible.
Given Assumptions 1.1-1.5, the win probability can be written as:
P [win|bi, N,M, F (v)] =
N−1∑
j=N−M
(N − 1)!
(N − j − 1)!j!F (vi)
j(1− F (vi))N−j−1.
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Given the winning probability I proceed to find the equation that characterizes
the equilibrium.
Proposition 1.1. Given Assumptions 1.1-1.5 and M=1, there exists a strictly
increasing symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of the game described above:
bi = s(vi, F,N) = (N − 1)
vi∫
v
vf(v)F (v)N−2dv. (1.1)
The first-order condition of this game can be written as:
vi =
s′(vi)
f(vi)F (vi)N−2(N − 1) . (1.2)
Proof: If the bid b corresponds to valuation v, b = s(v), the winning probability
is
P [win|b,N,M, F (v)] = F (v)N−1
Therefore expected utility of a bidder whose valuation is vi, but who bids as if his
valuation was v is:
V (vi, v) = viF (v)
N−1 − s(v).
Using the First order condition (differentiating with respect to v and substituting
v = vi), we get:
0 = vi(N − 1)F (vi)N−2f(vi)− s′(vi).
From this differential equation we obtain the value vi:
vi =
s′(vi)
f(vi)F (vi)N−2(N − 1) .
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It follows that the equilibrium strategy is
bi = s(vi, F,N) = (N − 1)
vi∫
v
vf(v)F (v)N−2dv.
The case M=1 was considered for simplicity of the presentation. It can be
easily generalized for any M.1
Usually, valuations are unobserved for the econometrician, whereas bids are
observed in the data. Let us denote by G(·) the distribution of bids. The next
section discusses how to recover the distribution of vi from the distribution of bids
G(·) using equation (1.2).
1.3.2 Nonparametric Identification
In this section, I prove the nonparametric identification of the IPV model.
In structural estimation, the first main question is whether the parameters of
the economic model are identified from the available data or not. The distribution
F (·) of bidders’ valuations is the only unknown element for the econometrician.
The number N of bidders, and the bids bi, i = 1, ..., N are observed. Therefore the
question is whether there exists a distribution F corresponding to the observables
and whether this function is unique.
The bids distribution G(·) depends on F (·) not only through vi but also
through the equilibrium strategy s(·). Thus for the successful identification, both
F , as well as the equilibrium strategy should be canceled out once the bids dis-
tribution and density are plugged in into the first-order condition (1.2).
1For instance, for M = 2: Pr[win|b,N,M,F (v)] = F (v)N−2(N−1− (N−2)F (v)). It follows
that
vi =
s′(vi)
f(vi)F (vi)N−3(N − 1)(N − 2)(1− F (vi)) .
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Let G(·) denote the joint distribution of (b1, ..., bN). Then the following propo-
sition, analogous to Theorem 1 in Guerre et al. (2000)2, holds:
Proposition 1.2. Let N ≥ M. Let G(·) belong to the set of absolutely continuous
probability distributions with support [b, b¯]N . There exists an absolutely continuous
distribution of bidders’ valuations F (·) such that G(·) is the distribution of the
equilibrium bids in the all-pay auction with independent private values if and only
if:
1. G(b1, ..., bN) =
∏N
i=1 G(bi).
2. The function ξ(·, N,G) ≡ 1
g(bi)G(bi)N−2(N−1) is strictly increasing on [b, b¯] and
its inverse is differentiable on [v, v¯] = [ξ(b,N,G), ξ(b¯, N,G)].
Moreover, when F (·) exists, it is unique with support [v, v¯] and satisfies F (v) =
G(ξ−1(v,N,G)) for all [v, v¯]. In addition, ξ(·, N,G) is the quasi inverse of the
equilibrium strategy in the sense that ξ(b,N,G) = s−1(b,N, F ) for all b ∈ [b, b¯].
Proof: For any b ∈ [b, b¯] = [s(v), s(v¯)] it holds that G(b) = Pr(b1 ≤ b) = Pr(v1 ≤
s−1(b)) = F (s−1(b)) = F (v), where b = s(v). Thus the bids distribution G(·) has
support [s(v), s(v¯)] and its density is g(b) = f(v)
s′(v) , where v = s
−1(b).
This allows us to rewrite the differential equation (1.2) above in terms of the
distribution of bids, that is
vi =
1
g(bi)G(bi)N−2(N − 1) . (1.3)
As a result, we obtain the expression for private value vi as a function of the bids
bi, its distribution G(·), its density g(·), and the number of bidders N . The rest
follows from the proof of Theorem 1 in Guerre et al. (2000).
2I use the same notation as in Guerre et al. (2000) for convenience.
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The next section discusses the estimation procedure.
1.3.3 Nonparametric Estimation
In this section, the consistent plug-in estimation for the bidder’s valuation is
proposed.
Given equation (1.3), the plug-in estimator is constructed in the following way.
The first step is to estimate the bids distribution G(·) and density g(·) as using
them the econometrician would be able to find the corresponding valuations, which
in turn can be used to estimate the density function f(·). More precisely, as G(b)
is the marginal distribution of equilibrium bids in N -bidder auctions and g(b) is
the associated density, they can be estimated using kernel function as follows.
Consider LN - the number of N -bidders auctions. I index by l the l-th auction
and use the observations {bil, i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., LN} to find the nonparametric
estimates of G(·) and g(·). Thus,
Gˆ(b) =
1
LN
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(bil ≤ b), (1.4)
gˆ(b) =
1
LNhg
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
Kg
(b− bil
hg
)
, (1.5)
where hg denotes the bandwidth and K denotes the kernel function.
As a result, we can estimate vi by plugging in the estimates Gˆ and gˆ into
equation (1.3).
Assumption 1.6. The data on {bi} is i.i.d.
Assumption 1.7. The density g(b) has compact support, is continuously differ-
entiable of order m ≥ δ+ k, k ≥ 2, with derivatives which are uniformly bounded.
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Assumption 1.8. The kernel function is of order δ, it has compact support and
is continuously differentiable on its support.
Assumption 1.9. As L → ∞, hg → 0,
√
Lhg → ∞,
√
Lh1+2kg → 0, where
L = LN ∗N .
Proposition 1.3. Given the Assumptions 1.1-1.5 about the model as well as As-
sumptions 1.6-1.9 are satisfied the following is the consistent estimator of the
valuation of player i in auction l:
vˆil
p−→ vil,
where:
vˆil =
1
gˆ(bil)Gˆ(bil)N−2(N − 1)
. (1.6)
These are the pseudo values.
Proof: In the Appendix.
In the next step to estimate the density f(·) I use the pseudo-sample {vˆil, i =
1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., LN} and the kernel function:
fˆ(v) =
1
LNhf
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
Kf
(v − vˆil
hf
)
. (1.7)
Here hf is the bandwidth and Kf - kernel function.
Note that the invertibility of the bid function is the key thing for identifica-
tion as I relied on the assumption that the bidders use a strictly increasing bid
function.3
3It is possible to account for the case when the number of bidders is not known to the
participants, but they receive a signal with known distribution.
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1.3.4 Monte Carlo Simulation
In this section, a Monte Carlo study is conducted. It is similar to the one in
Guerre et al. (2000) and describes the estimation procedure in detail.
I assume that the data on L = 500 auctions with N = 2 players taking part
in them is given. The number of auctions and players per se do not change the
estimation procedure as the bidders are assumed to be ex-ante symmetric. What
plays a role in the estimation is the total number of observations, which is given
by L∗N . In this study, the true distribution function F of valuation is log-normal
with parameters zero and one, truncated at 0.055 and 2.5 that leads to leaving
out 20% approximately of the original log-normal distribution. 1000 Monte Carlo
replications are conducted. Next, each replication is described.
To start with, L ∗ N observations of valuations are drawn randomly and the
corresponding equilibrium strategies bil, i = 1, 2, l = 1, ..., L defined in equation
(1.1) are calculated. After that, given the bids, the CDF is estimated using (1.4)
and the bids’ density function is estimated using (1.5). Specifically, I use the
triweight kernel:
K(u) =
35
32
(1− u2)31(|u| ≤ 1).
This is a kernel of order 2. The important property is that it has compact
support and the kernel function is continuously differentiable on its support.
There are many other kernels satisfying the above properties. In its turn, hg =
1.06σˆb(NL)
−1/5, where σˆb is the estimated standard deviation of the bids. The
order is L−1/5 as according to the Theorem 3 in Guerre et al. (2000) when the
valuations are not observed but should be estimated by choosing the bandwidths
hg = cg(logL/L)
1/(2R+3) and hf = cf (logL/L)
1/(2R+3), where R is the number
of bounded continuous derivatives of f(·), the optimal convergence rate can be
reached. In our case R = 1. Constant 1.06 is the result of the so-called rule of
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thumb (see Hardle (1991)).
Knowing the estimated distribution and density of the bids we are ready to
estimate the valuations. The issue here is that the estimator of density g is biased
on the borders of the support. More precisely on [b, b + ρghg/2) and on (b¯ −
ρghg/2, b¯], where ρg is the length of the support of the kernel. In our case ρg = 2.
If we consider bmin to be the minimum of the observed bids and bmax the maximum
of the observed bids, then the gˆ is unbiased on [bmin+ρghg/2, bmax−ρghg/2]. Thus
I trim the estimated valuations specified in (1.6):
vˆil =

1
gˆ(bil)Gˆ(bil)N−2(N−1) ,
if bmin + ρghg/2 ≤ bil ≤ bmax − ρghg/2
∞, otherwise
(1.8)
The final step is the estimation of the density function of valuations fˆ(·) using
(1.7). Here hf = 1.06σˆv(NLT )
−1/5, LT is the number of auctions that are left after
the trimming and σˆb is the estimated standard deviation of vˆil. In each replication
I estimate fˆ(·) at 500 equally spaced points on [0.055, 2.5].
Figure 1.1 presents the true density of the truncated log-normal distribution,
and for each value of v in the support, the mean of the 1000 estimates fˆ(v),
together with the 5% quantile, and the 95% quantile.
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Figure 1.1: True and estimated densities of valuations in IPV model
The important result is that inside the interval marked by the vertical dashed
lined defined by the average of [s(bmin + hg) + hf , s(bmax − hg) − hf ] the true
density function is approximated by the mean of the 1000 Monte Carlo estimates
almost perfectly. On the borders, the estimation is biased due to the bias of kernel
estimators and trimming.
In addition in Figure 1.2 the true equilibrium strategy b = s(v) is represented
as well as for each b ∈ [s(0.055), s(2.5)] the mean of the 1000 estimates vˆ(b) =
s−1(b), together with the 5% quantile, and the 95% quantile.
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Figure 1.2: True and estimated equilibrium bids in IPV model
In this case inside the interval marked by the horizontal dashed lined defined by
the average of [bmin +hg, bmax−hg] the true equilibrium strategy is approximated
by the mean of the 1000 Monte Carlo estimates almost perfectly. On the borders,
the estimation is biased due to the bias of kernel estimators.
1.3.5 Observed Heterogeneity
The model can be extended to account for observed heterogeneity. Let Nl be the
number of bidders in the l-th auction and Xl is the vector of observed character-
istics. In this setting, the distribution of vil for the l-th auction is the conditional
distribution F (·|Xl, Nl) of valuations given (Xl, Nl). In its turn, the distribution
of observed bids in the l-th auction is G(·|Xl, Nl). Thus
vil =
1
g(bil|Xl, Nl)G(bil|Xl, Nl)N−2(N − 1) ,
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where
G(b|x, i) = G(b, x, i)
fl(x, i)
, g(b|x, i) = g(b, x, i)
fl(x, i)
.
These ratios can be estimated using observations {(bil, Xl, Nl, i = 1, ..., Nl, l =
1, ..., L}
Gˆ(b, x, i) =
1
LhdG
L∑
l=1
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
1(bil ≤ b)KG
(
x−Xl
hG
,
i−Nl
hGN
)
,
gˆ(b, x, i) =
1
Lhd+1g
L∑
l=1
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Kg
(
b− bil
hg
,
x−Xl
hg
,
i−Nl
hgN
)
,
fˆl(x, i) =
1
Lhd
L∑
l=1
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
K
(
x−Xl
h
,
i−Nl
h
)
,
where h denotes the bandwidth and K denotes the kernel function.
As a result, we are able to estimate:
vˆil =
1
gˆ(bil|Xl, Nl)Gˆ(bil|Xl, Nl)N−2(N − 1)
.
Next, using the pseudo sample {(vˆil, Xl), i = 1, ..., Nl, l = 1, ..., L}, we estimate
nonparametrically the density f(v|x) by fˆ(v|x) = fˆ(v,x)
fˆ(x)
, where
fˆ(v, x) =
1
Lhd+1f
L∑
l=1
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Kf
(
v − vˆil
hf
,
x−Xl
hf
)
,
fˆ(x) =
1
Lhdx
L∑
l=1
Kx
(
x−Xl
hx
)
,
where h denotes the bandwidth and K denotes the kernel function.
The procedure is very similar to the one before except for the fact that we
condition of the observables and thus much more data is required.
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1.4 APV All-Pay Auction with Risk-Neutral Bidders
1.4.1 Model
In this section, I consider the same set-up with the affiliated private values (APV).
Assumption 1.10. Symmetric APV model is considered, thus all bidders are ex-
ante identical. Each of the bidders knows the joint distribution of the valuations
F.
The case of the first-price auction was considered in Li et al. (2002). The
authors use the same idea as in Guerre et al. (2000) to make use of the kernel
density estimators. As before I only consider Bayesian Nash equilibrium that is
strictly increasing, differentiable and symmetric. At first, I consider just one unit
of indivisible good for sale. Then the analysis will be extended to the case of M
units in Section 4.5.
Each bidder i chooses a bid bi to maximize his utility:
E[Ui|Vi = vi, V−i = v−i] = viP [win|bi, N, F (·)]− bi = viP [Bi ≤ bi|vi]− bi,
where Bi = s(yi), yi = maxj 6=i vj, and s(·) is the equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1.4. Given Assumptions 1.1-1.5 and 1.10 are satisfied, as well as
M=1, there exists the strictly increasing symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of the
game described above:
bi = s(vi) =
vi∫
v
v · fy1|v1(v|v)dv. (1.9)
The first-order condition of this game can be written as:
vi =
s′(vi)
fy1|v1(vi|vi)
. (1.10)
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Proof: The expected utility of a bidder whose valuation is vi, but who bids as if
his valuation was v is:
V (vi, v) = vi
∫ v
v
fy1|v1(y|v)dy − s(v).
Using the First order condition (differentiating with respect to v and substituting
v = vi), we get:
0 = vi · fy1|v1(vi|vi)− s′(vi),
for all vi ∈ [v, v¯] such that s(v) = v. fy1|v1(·|·) is the notation for conditional
density of y1 given v1. Here 1 is the index of any bidder as all of them are identical
ex-ante. As a result, we get the following differential equation determining the
bid function:
s′(vi) = vi · fy1|v1(vi|vi), (1.11)
therefore
bi = s(vi) =
vi∫
v
v · fy1|v1(v|v)dv.
From the differential equation (1.11) we obtain the value vi:
vi =
s′(vi)
fy1|v1(vi|vi)
.
This proves the proposition.
Using the first-order condition we will be able to identify the model.
1.4.2 Nonparametric Identification
In this section, I prove the nonparametric identification of the APV model.
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As in the case of the IPV model, the APV model is identified whenever the
distribution function F can be found by the econometrician uniquely given the
data on the bids.
Let GB1|b1(·|·) be the conditional distribution of B1 given b1 and gB1|b1(·|·) be
the corresponding density.
Then the following proposition analogous to Proposition 1 in Li et al. (2002)4
holds:
Proposition 1.5. Let N ≥ 2. Let G(·) belong to the set of absolutely continuous
probability distributions with support [b, b¯]N . Then the symmetric APV model is
identified. Moreover, distribution G(·) with support [b, b¯]N can be rationalized by
a symmetric APV model if and only if
1. G(·) is symmetric and affiliated, and
2. the function ξ(·, N,G) ≡ 1
gB1|b1 (bi|bi)
is strictly increasing on [b, b¯].
Proof: Analogously to Li et al. (2002):
GB1|b1(B|b) = P (B1 ≤ B|b1 = b) = P (y1 ≤ s−1(B)|v1 = s−1(b)) =
= Fy1|v1(s
−1(B)|s−1(b)).
Thus
gB1|b1(B|b) =
fy1|v1(s
−1(B)|s−1(b))
s′(s−1(B))
.
As a result, using the two equations above and condition v = s−1(b), the first-order
condition (1.10) can be rewritten as:
vi =
1
gB1|b1(bi|bi)
. (1.12)
4I use the same notation as in Li et al. (2002) for convenience.
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The rest follows from the proof of Proposition 1 in Li et al. (2002).
The next section discusses the estimation procedure.
1.4.3 Nonparametric Estimation
In this section, the consistent plug-in estimation for the bidder’s valuation is
proposed.
Similar to the IPV case, the first step is the estimation of the conditional bid
density gB1|b1(·|·) using the data on bids. In the next step, the pseudo valuations
can be estimated using the equation (1.12). The last step is the estimation of the
density of the valuations from the obtained pseudo values using kernel estimator.
Since
gB1|b1(B|b) =
gB1,b1(B, b)
gb1(b)
, (1.13)
joint density should be estimated as well as the density of b1.
Let LN be the number N -bidders auctions. I index by l the l-th auction and
use the observations {bil, i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., LN} to estimate nonparametrically
gB1,b1(·, ·) and gb1(·).
gˆB1,b1(B, b) =
1
LNh2g
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
Kg
(B −Bil
hg
,
b− bil
hg
)
, (1.14)
gˆb1(b) =
1
LNh
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
K
(b− bil
h
)
, (1.15)
where h denotes the bandwidth and K denotes the kernel function.
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Proposition 1.6. Given the Assumptions 1.1-1.10 are satisfied and M=1 the
following is the consistent estimator of the valuation of player i in auction l:
vˆil
p−→ vil,
where:
vˆil =
1
gˆB1|b1(bil|bil)
=
gˆb1(bil)
gˆB1,b1(bil, bil)
. (1.16)
These are the pseudo values.
Proof: In the Appendix.
To estimate the joint density f(·, ..., ·) I use the pseudo-sample {vˆil, i = 1, ..., N, l =
1, ..., LN}
fˆ(v1, ..., vN) =
1
LNhNf
LN∑
l=1
Kf
(v1 − vˆ1l
hf
, ...,
vN − vˆNl
hf
)
,
for any value (v1, ..., vN).
In its turn, to estimate the marginal density
fˆ(v) =
1
LNhf
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
Kf
(v − vˆil
hf
)
. (1.17)
for any value v ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly to the IPV case, it is possible to account for the observed hetero-
geneity by conditioning on the unobservables.
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1.4.4 Monte Carlo Simulation
In this section, the estimation is described step by step by conducting a Monte
Carlo study.
I consider the scenario when the data on L = 500 auctions, each with N = 2
bidders is given. It could be easily generalized to account for the case when there
is a different number of bidders. Following Li et al. (2002) I consider the simplest
case of affiliated values distribution.
Private values are assumed to be the sum of the two uniform random variables
vi = γ + ui, where γ is U [0.25, 0.75], and the ui’s are independently drawn from
U [−0.25, 0.25] so that they are correlated through γ and corr(vi, vj) = 0.5. Then
fγ(x) = 2, x ∈ [0.25, 0.75], fu(y) = 2, y ∈ [−0.25, 0.25], thus
f(v) =
∫
fγ(v − y)fu(y)dy = 2
0.25∫
−0.25
fγ(v − y)dy =

v−0.25∫
−0.25
4dy, v ∈ [0, 0.5]
0.25∫
v−0.75
4dy, v ∈ [0.5, 1]
It follows that the marginal density of the valuations is triangular:
f(v) =

4v, v ∈ [0, 0.5]
4− 4v, v ∈ [0.5, 1]
and F (v) =

2v2, v ∈ [0, 0.5]
4v − 2v2 − 1, v ∈ [0.5, 1]
(1.18)
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It can also be shown that
fy1,v1(t, s) =

8t, t < s < 1/2, t > 0
8s, s < t < 1/2, s > 0
8t− 8s+ 4, t < 1/2, 1/2 < s < t+ 1/2
8s− 8t+ 4, s < 1/2, 1/2 < t < s+ 1/2
8− 8s, s < 1, 1/2 < t < s
8− 8t, t < 1, 1/2 < s < t
and
fy1,v1(v, v) =

8v, v ∈ [0, 0.5]
8− 8v, v ∈ [0.5, 1]
As a result,
fy1|v1(v|v) = 2, v ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly, in general case, for any N it can also be shown that
fy1|v1(v|v) =

1−(2v−1)N−1
1−v , v ∈ [0, 0.5]
2N−1vN−2, v ∈ [0.5, 1].
Thus we can find the corresponding bids. In case when N = 2 using (1.9)
bi =
vi∫
0
2vdv = v2i , vi ∈ [0, 1].
1000 Monte Carlo simulations are conducted. For each simulation 500 values
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of γ and 1000 values of ui are drawn, and then vi are calculated. Next, for each
value draw the corresponding bid is calculated. Given the bids, the first step of
estimation is conducted, using (1.14) and (1.15) the joint and marginal densities
are estimated. In each estimation the triweight kernel is used:
K(u) =
35
32
(1− u2)31(|u| ≤ 1).
This is a kernel of order 2. It is continuously differentiable and has compact sup-
port, thus rhog = 2. In its turn h = 1.06σˆb(NL)
−1/5 and hg = 1.06σˆb(NL)−1/6,
where σˆb is the estimator of the standard deviation of the bids. Given the es-
timators of joint and marginal densities the pseudo values (1.16) are calculated
and trimmed as in the case of the IPV model to account for the bias of kernel
estimation:
vˆil =

1
gˆB1|b1 (bil|bil)
=
gˆb1 (bil)
gˆB1,b1 (bil,bil)
,
if bmin + ρghg/2 ≤ bil ≤ bmax − ρghg/2
∞, otherwise
(1.19)
The final step is the estimation of fˆ(·) using (1.17). Here hf = 1.06σˆv(NLT )−1/5,
LT is the number of auctions that are left after the trimming. In its turn, σˆb is
the estimator of the standard deviation of the pseudo values. In each replication,
I estimate fˆ(·) at 500 equally spaced points on [0, 1]. The Figure 1.3 presents the
true triangular marginal density, and for each value of v ∈ [0, 1], the mean of the
1000 estimates fˆ(v), together with the 5% quantile, and the 95% quantile.
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Figure 1.3: True and estimated densities of valuations in APV model
The Figure below describes the situation when the model is estimated as IPV,
whereas in reality, it is an APV setting.
Figure 1.4: True and estimated densities of valuations: IPV and APV comparison
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1.4.5 Model with Multiple Units
The model could be extended to the case with M units for sale. In this case,
instead of B1 I introduce Bm = s(ym), ym is m-th largest bid among others’ bids.
In this case
s′(vi) = vi · fym|v1(vi|vi).
And as a result we get:
v =
1
gBm|b1(b|b)
.
I use the estimates:
gˆBm,b1(B, b) =
1
LNh2g
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
Kg
(B −Bil
hg
,
b− bil
hg
)
,
gˆb1(b) =
1
LNh
LN∑
l=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
K
(b− bil
h
)
,
where h denotes the bandwidth and K denotes the kernel function.
Thus:
vˆil =
1
gˆBm|b1(bil|bil)
=
gˆb1(bil)
gˆBm,b1(bil|bil)
.
To estimate the joint density f(·, ..., ·) the pseudo-sample {vˆil, i = 1, ..., N, l =
1, ..., LN} is used as before.
1.5 IPV All-Pay Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders
1.5.1 Model
As in previous sections assume that there are N bidders, i = 1, ..., N . Each bidder
draws a value vi independently from a commonly known distribution F (v) with
support [v, v¯]. vi is the private value that bidder i of possessing the good. In
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contrast to the previous set-up now each bidder is risk-averse, therefore he has
utility function U(·), such that: U(0) = 0, U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) ≤ 0, which are
standard assumptions. Without loss of generality let us normalize U(1) = 1.
Each bidder i knows the number of bidders N , his value vi, as well as the
distribution of the valuations of the other bidders F (v) and utility function U(·).
Again I consider the Bayesian equilibrium of this incomplete information game
which is strictly monotonic and symmetric. The bid function is defined by s(v) =
b. As s(v) is strictly monotonic it is invertible, so s−1(b) = v. In addition to these
assumptions using the independence of the valuations, we can write the expected
payoff to bidder i as:
E[Ui|Vi = vi, V−i = v−i] = U(vi − bi)FN−1(s−1(bi)) + U(−bi)[1− FN−1(s−1(bi))].
Taking the first derivative with respect to the bid we get:
0 = −U ′(vi−bi)FN−1(s−1(bi))+U(vi−bi)(N−1)FN−(s−1(bi))f(s−1(bi)) 1
s′(s−1(bi))
−
−U ′(−bi)[1− FN−1(s−1(bi))]− U(−bi)(N − 1)FN−(s−1(bi))f(s−1(bi)) 1
s′(s−1(bi))
.
Substituting s−1(bi) = vi and rearranging the terms we get the first-order differ-
ential equation which determines the bid function:
s′(vi) =
(N − 1)f(vi)FN−2(vi)[U(vi − bi)− U(−bi)]
U ′(−bi) + FN−1(vi)[U ′(vi − bi)− U ′(−bi)] . (1.20)
Using this equation I prove that the model is not identified. Analogous result for
the case of first-price auction is derived in Campo et al. (2011).
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1.5.2 Nonidentification Result
I have shown in section 3.1 that F (vi) = G(bi) and
f(vi)
s′(vi)
= g(bi), thus we can
rewrite the equation 1.20 as
(N − 1)g(vi)GN−2(vi)[U(vi − bi)− U(−bi)]
U ′(−bi) +GN−1(bi)[U ′(vi − bi)− U ′(−bi)] = 1.
Following Guerre et al. (2009), let us call the model a set of structures [U, F ]. A
structure [U, F ] is non-identified if there exists another structure [U ′, F ′] within
the model that leads to the same equilibrium bid distribution. If no such structure
[U ′, F ′] exists for any [U, F ], the model is (globally) identified.
Proposition 1.7. In general the IPV model with risk-averse bidders is not iden-
tified. Moreover, any structure [U, F ] in UCARA × F is not identified. Formally,
consider N = 2, U(x) = 1−exp(−ax)
1−exp(−a) , a > 0. Then any structure [U, F ] with
F (v) = 2−a−2 exp(−av)
(1−exp(−av))(2−a) , v ∈ [− 1a ln
(
2−a
2
)
,+∞), where a ∈ [1, 2), leads to the
exponential distribution G(b) = 1− exp−2b on [0,+∞).
Proof: Let’s consider CARA utility function such that :
U(x) =
1− exp(−ax)
1− exp(−a) , a > 0.
Thus U ′(x) = a exp(−ax)
1−exp(−a) > 0 and U
′′(x) = −a
2 exp(−ax)
1−exp(−a) < 0.
Let’s also fix N=2. In this case the differential equation becomes (I omit index
i for simplicity):
1 =
g(b)[1− exp(−av + ab)− 1 + exp(ab)]
a exp(ab) +G(b)[a exp(−av + ab)− a exp(ab)]
which (after deviding both numerator and denominator by exp(ab)) is equivalent
to
1 =
g(b)[1− exp(−av)]
a− aG(b)[1− exp(−av)] .
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Let’s find v from this equation. 1− exp(−av) = a
g(b)+aG(b)
⇒
v = −1
a
ln
(
1− a
g(b) + aG(b)
)
.
Now let’s consider exponential family of distributions G(b) = 1 − exp−λb, b ≥ 0,
g(b) = λ exp−λb. Then g(b) + aG(b) = λ exp−λb +a(1− exp−λb) and
∂[g(b)+aG(b)]
∂b
= −λ2 exp−λb +aλ exp−λb = λ exp−λb(a− λ) < 0 when λ > a. Thus in
this case v is an increasing function of b.
Let’s find the bid function: g(b) + aG(b) = a
1−exp(−av) ⇒ (λ − a) exp−λb =
a
1−exp(−av) ⇒
b = s(v) = −1
λ
ln
( a exp(−av)
(1− exp(−av))(λ− a)
)
.
In its turn
F (v) = G(b(v)) = 1−exp−λb = 1− a exp(−av)
(1− exp(−av))(λ− a) =
λ− a− λ exp(−av)
(1− exp(−av))(λ− a) .
b ∈ [0; +∞), therefore v is well-defined, but has the moving support since v =
− 1
a
ln
(
λ−a
λ
)
if b = 0 and v = +∞ if b = +∞.
In particular, this is true if λ=2. This proves the proposition.
As a result, it was shown that this model is not identified even in the semi-
parametric case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to
the class of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
1.6 Conclusion
In this work, I have proved the identification and derived the consistent estimator
of an all-pay auction. I have adopted the structural approach of Guerre et al.
(2000) and have proved that the distribution function of bidders’ valuations is
identified nonparametrically from the data in both IPV and APV settings. The
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important property of the estimation is that the determination of the equilibrium
strategy is avoided since I only use the first-order condition. This allows the
estimation of the distribution of valuations even in the case when the closed-form
solution cannot be explicitly found. Finally, I considered the model with risk
aversion. I show that this model is not identified even in the semi-parametric
case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to the class
of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof: By Theorem 1.1 from Li and Racine (2006):
gˆ(bil)− g(bil) = Op(h2g + (Lhg)−1/2) = op(1).
In its turn by the string law of large numbers empirical CDF converges almost
surely to the true CDF, thus also converges in probability.
Thus, by the properties of convergence in probability and continuous mapping
theorem,
1
gˆ(bil)Gˆ(bil)N−2(N − 1)
p−→ 1
g(bil)G(bil)N−2(N − 1) .
1.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Proof: By Theorem 1.1 from Li and Racine (2006):
gˆb1(bil)− gb1(bil) = op(1).
Moreover, by Theorem 1.3 from Li and Racine (2006):
gˆB1,b1(bil, bil)− gB1,b1(bil, bil) = op(1).
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Thus, by the properties of convergence in probability and continuous mapping
theorem,
gˆb1(bil)
gˆB1,b1(bil, bil)
p−→ gb1(bil)
gB1,b1(bil, bil)
.
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CHAPTER 2
Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of
Contests with Uncertainty and an Application
to U.S. House Elections
2.1 Introduction
In this work, I prove the identification and derive the asymptotically normal es-
timator of a nonparametric contest of incomplete information with uncertainty.
This is the first paper to consider the identification and estimation of a model with
a nonparametric contest success function which determines the winning probabil-
ity. Similar to Guerre et al. (2000) and He and Huang (2018) I propose a method
to estimate the distribution of bidders’ private valuations (or types) from observed
bids as well as the winning outcomes, which does not require any parametric as-
sumptions or the Bayesian Nash equilibrium computation.
The contest is a natural model of costly competition as it describes situations
when all players exert costly effort to achieve some goal (win the contest). This is
a sunk cost as no matter whether a player wins or loses the bidder always pays the
bid. Such interactions include a wide range of scenarios. The electoral competition
was modeled using contest theory since the 1990: see, for example, Snyder (1989),
Baron (1994) or Skaperdas and Grofman (1995). Moreover, it is used to model
marketing and advertising by firms (Bell et al. (1975)); litigation (Farmer and
Pecorino (1999), Bernardo et al. (2000), Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Baye
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et al. (2005)); research and development, patent race, procurement of innovative
good, research contests ( Taylor (1995), Che and Gale (2003)); sport events, arms
race and rent-seeking activity, such as lobbying (Tullock (1980), Krueger (1974),
Baye et al. (1993)).
The contest is defined by the contest success function that maps efforts (bids)
into probabilities of winning for participating players (bidders).1 In this work,
I consider a contest with uncertainty. By uncertainty I mean that the contest
success function is not only determined by the bids of the players, but also by a
variable, which I call uncertainty, with a nonparametric distribution, known to
the bidders, but unknown to the researcher. The model is described in detail in
the next section.
Moreover, I consider the incomplete information contest in contrast to most
of the theoretical papers on contests and auctions that consider games with com-
plete information. In reality, it is more plausible to think that the bidders do not
observe the private information of the other bidders. Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010)
and Ewerhart (2014) are a few of the papers providing the existence of equilib-
rium results in the context of incomplete information contests. The literature on
nonparametric identification and estimation of incomplete information auctions
and contests is very sparse as well. Only the first-price auctions were considered
in detail in the block of papers originated from Guerre et al. (2000). In the pre-
vious chapter, I considered all-pay auctions (an extreme case of a contest). And
the only paper that considers a contest as a game with incomplete information
is the one by the He and Huang (2018). In that paper, the authors assume that
the contest success function has the Tullock’s form. I will show that the Tullock
contest is a particular case of a contest with uncertainty considered in this work,
1All-pay auction is an extreme case of the contest when the bidder with the highest bid wins;
thus, the winning probability is one if and only if the bidder has the highest bid. In reality, in
the scenarios described above, it is common that the contestant with the highest bid can still
lose, thus it is important to consider contests for empirical applications.
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in a case when the distribution of uncertainty is known to be exponential.
I examine the model with two asymmetric players in this work. Every bidder
pays his bid regardless of whether he wins or not. Each bidder has a valuation
of the good, which is his private information, and knowing his own valuation, the
number of bidders and the distribution of the other bidders’ valuations, submits a
bid in order to obtain an object. The model is a game of incomplete information
in the sense that the bidders do not observe the other bidders’ valuations, but
the distributions of the valuations are common knowledge. As a result of the
identification and estimation of the model, I recover the distributions of bidders’
valuations. The novelty of the paper is that as the first step, I estimate the
nonparametric distribution of uncertainty using the information on win outcomes
and bids.
Importantly for the empirical application, the model can be reformulated in
terms of types instead of valuations, meaning that each player instead has a dif-
ferent type, which is just the inverse of the valuation. The type characterizes how
costly it is for the player to raise a bid, whereas the valuations are normalized to
be 1. I show that this model is equivalent to the one with the different valuations’
distributions.
As an empirical application, I consider the U.S. House of Representatives elec-
tions, which were also studied by He and Huang (2018) as an application of the
Tullock contest. Bidders in this setting are considered to have different abilities
to raise money (types described above), whereas the valuations are normalized to
be 1. Using the model, I disentangle and estimate two potential advantages of the
Incumbent. The first source of advantage is due to the fact that the Incumbent
often has a better reputation and is more experienced than the Challenger. The
other source of advantage is the Incumbent’s better campaign financing. Only the
latter can be regulated by the authority; thus, it is important that this source of
advantage can be quantified separately from the reputation effect. A large body
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of empirical work studies the effect of campaign spending on the vote share in
the context of Congressional elections starting from the pioneering work of Ja-
cobson (1978). My work contributes to the literature by providing a method of
recovering the incumbency advantage in campaign financing (characterized by the
difference in type distributions between the candidates), as well as the advantage
of the Incumbent due to the reputation (characterized by the uncertainty distri-
bution). This is done using the information on the observed spendings as well
as winning outcomes, and the nonparametric structural contest model.2 Results
of the model suggest that the Incumbent’s advantage was prevalent throughout
the sample period 1972-2016. Incumbents won in 93.8% of contests. Moreover,
on average Incumbents spent 2.5 times as much as their Challengers. Using the
structural model, I estimate that if the Incumbents were to spend as much as the
Challengers they would win only 85% of the times. The knowledge of the type
distributions allows policymakers to quantify the effect of different policy changes.
In this work, I consider two different policy counterfactuals aimed at limiting the
incumbency advantage: a public campaign financing of Challengers and a limit
on Incumbents’ expenditure. I show that the latter is more effective in terms of
lowering both the Incumbents’ winning probability as well as the total campaign
spending. This is in accordance with He and Huang (2018) conclusions, but in
contrast to the prevailing opinion that: ”the problem is not equalizing spending
between candidates but rather simply getting more money to Challengers so that
they can mount competitive races,” stated by Jacobson (1978).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the
contest model with uncertainty. Section 3 discusses the nonparametric identifi-
cation of the model. Section 4 considers the nonparametric estimation as well
as the Monte Carlo simulations. The application to the U.S. House Elections is
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2This is in contrast to the Tullock contest considered in He and Huang (2018) that imposes
the parametric structure on the winning probability.
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2.2 Contest Model with Uncertainty
2.2.1 Notations and Definitions
In this work, a contest with N = 2 asymmetric risk-neutral bidders is considered.
This is motivated by the nature of the application in which two candidates are
competing for a seat in U.S. House of Representatives: one is the Incumbent and
the other is the Challenger. The model can be easily extended to account for the
arbitrary number of bidders.
Assumption 2.1. Each bidder has a valuation of the good vi, i = 1, 2, which is
his private information. Each bidder draws this valuation vi independently from
a commonly known distribution Fi(v) with support [vi, v¯i], density fi and quantile
function qi = F
−1
i , i = 1, 2.
Assumption 2.2. The bidders submit the bids bi simultaneously.
Assumption 2.3. Each of N bidders pays bi, regardless of whether or not he
obtains a good.
Moreover, the impact of the campaign spending on the winning probability is
uncertain.
Assumption 2.4. The real impact is xi = g(bi, i), where i is assumed to be
independent of bi.
Assumption 2.5. At the time of bidding, each bidder i knows the number of
bidders, his own valuation vi as well as Fj(·) and the distributions of uncertainties
i, i = 1, 2.
The reason for such an Assumption 4 is that some of the voters have a prefer-
ence for the Incumbent versus the Challenger due to the Incumbent’s reputation,
and this is no matter what would be the campaign spending and advertising. On
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the other hand, for other voters, the campaign expenditure determines their pref-
erence. The goal is to disentangle and estimate these two potential advantages of
the Incumbent. The first source of advantage is due to the fact that the Incumbent
often has a better reputation and is more experienced than the Challenger. The
other source of advantage is the Incumbent’s better skills in raising money for the
campaign. In this work, I consider the case when the higher expenditures have
a multiplicative effect on the political impact: as in Hillman and Riley (1989),
where the model was introduced.
Assumption 2.6. xi = bi · i, i = 1, 2, where Hξ(·) is the CDF of 2/1 := ξ,
whereas by hξ(·) the corresponding density function.
Only positive xi can lead to victory; thus, i have positive support.
Moreover, let wi = 1 if bidder i wins and wi = 0 otherwise. Then the proba-
bility of winning of the first player given the bids is:
P (w1 = 1| b1, b2) = P (x1 > x2 | b1, b2) = P (b11 > b22 | b1, b2) (2.1)
where 1 and 2 are preferences for bidder 1 and bidder 2 respectively.
The expected payoff to bidder i participating in the contest, is given by:
E[Ui|vi, Fj, Hξ] = viP [wi = 1|vi, Fj, Hξ]− bi = viP (bii > bjj|vi, Fj, Hξ)− bi,
(2.2)
where i = 1, 2, j = −i.3 The final payoff to the bidder i is vi − bi if he obtains a
good, and −bi if he does not obtain a good.
It is worth noting that:
3This model can be extended to account for the observables by assuming:
P [wi = 1|vi, Fj , Hξ] = P [(bi +m(Xi))i ≥ (bj +m(Xj))j |vi, Fj , Hξ],
where both function m and distribution of 2/1 can be identified in the first step.
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Proposition 2.1. In a specific case when both i and j have an exponential
distribution with parameter λ = 1, the contest described above is equivalent to the
Tullock contest.
Proof: In the Appendix.
2.2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
I consider the strictly monotonic Bayesian equilibrium in this incomplete infor-
mation game. Using the results of Athey (2001), the existence of equilibrium can
be proved.
Proposition 2.2. Given Assumptions 2.1-2.6 are satisfied, there exists a pure
strategy increasing BNE of the incomplete information game formulated above.
Proof: In the Appendix.
For each valuation, the corresponding bid is defined by the function si(vi) =
bi, i = 1, 2 that is the equilibrium bid strategy which maximizes the bidder i’s
expected payoff. Since si(vi) is strictly monotonic it is invertible and s
−1
i (bi) = vi.
Proposition 2.3. Given Assumptions 1-6 as well as the assumption of strict
monotonicity of the bidding strategies the first-order conditions of this game can
be written as:
v1 =
1
v¯2∫
v2
f2(v2)
1
s2(v2)
hξ
(
s1(v1)
s2(v2)
)
dv2
(2.3)
v2 =
1
v¯1∫
v1
f1(v1)
s1(v1)
s22(v2)
hξ
(
s1(v1)
s2(v2)
)
dv1
(2.4)
Proof: Under the assumptions of strict monotonicity of the bidding strategies and
independent valuations, we can write the expected payoff to bidder 1 when his
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true valuation is v1 but he bids as if it was v as:
E[U1|v1, F2, Hξ] =
= v1P [w1 = 1|b, F2, Hξ]− b = v1P (b1 > b22)− b = v1P (b2ξ < b)− b =
= v1
b¯2∫
b2
 b/b2∫
0
hξ(y)dy
 g2(b2)db2 − b =
v1
v¯2∫
v2
 s1(v)/s2(v2)∫
0
hξ(y)dy
 f2(v2)dv2 − s1(v).
Using the First order condition (differentiating with respect to v and substitut-
ing v = vi and equating it to zero) we get the following equation for the valuation
of player 1:
v1
v¯2∫
v2
s′1(v)
s2(v2)
hξ
(
s1(v)
s2(v2)
)
f2(v2)dv2 − s′1(v) = 0 when v = v1 ⇒
v1 =
1
v¯2∫
v2
f2(v2)
1
s2(v2)
hξ
(
s1(v1)
s2(v2)
)
dv2
Similarly for player 2 we can write the expected payoff to bidder 2 when his true
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valuation is v2 but he bids as if it was v as:
E[U2|v2, F1, Hξ] =
= v2P [w2 = 1|b, F1, Hξ]− b = v2P (b2 > b11)− b = v2P (ξ > b1/b)− b =
= v2
b¯1∫
b1
 ∞∫
b1/b
hξ(y)dy
 g1(b1)db1 − b =
v2
v¯1∫
v1
 ∞∫
s1(v1)/s2(v)
hξ(y)dy
 f1(v1)dv1 − s2(v).
By taking derivative with respect to v and equating it to zero we get the following
equation for the valuation of player 2:
v2
v¯1∫
v1
s′2(v)s1(v1)
s22(v)
hξ
(
s1(v1)
s2(v)
)
f1(v1)dv1 − s′2(v) = 0 when v = v2 ⇒
v2 =
1
v¯1∫
v1
f1(v1)
s1(v1)
s22(v2)
hξ
(
s1(v1)
s2(v2)
)
dv1
This proves the proposition.
In our case, given the data, private values are unobserved for the econometri-
cian, whereas bids are observed. Thus the goal would be to rewrite right hand
sides of the equations (2.3) and (2.4) in terms of distribution of bids. The method
is described in detail in the Section on Identification.
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2.2.2.1 Representation in Terms of Types
The problem can be easily reformulated in terms of the types (how costly is it to
raise a bid for the player). Expected payoff to bidder i in this case is given by:
E[Ui|ci, Fj(c), Hξ] = P [wi = 1|ci, Fj, Hξ]− cibi = P (bii > bjj|ci, Fj, Hξ)− cibi,
(2.5)
where i = 1, 2, j = −i, ci = 1vi and Fi is the type distribution function whereas fi
is the corresponding density.
Thus equations (2.3) and (2.4) can be written in terms of types:
c1 =
c¯2∫
c2
f2(c2)
1
s2(c2)
hξ
(
s1(c1)
s2(c2)
)
dc2 (2.6)
and
c2 =
c¯1∫
c1
f1(c1)
s1(c1)
s22(c2)
hξ
(
s1(c1)
s2(c2)
)
dc1 (2.7)
2.3 Nonparametric Identification
In this section, I prove that the parameters of the model are nonparametrically
identified from available data, which is the main question in structural estimation.
In the presented model there are two unknown structural elements for the
econometrician - the distribution of valuations F (·) as well as the distribution
Hξ(·) of 2/1 := ξ, whereas the number of bidders, the bids themselves bi, i = 1, 2
as well as the win results, are observed. Therefore the identification problem
reduces to whether the distributions F and Hξ are uniquely determined from
observed bids and win outcomes. Note that the distribution G(·) of bi depends
on the underlying distribution F (·) not only through vi, but also through the
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equilibrium strategy s(·).
Formally, let G denote the set of all distributions over the space of permitted
bids and let p denote the win probability of the Incumbent, F ∈ F and H ∈ H.
Let us call the mapping from the private information to bids γ ∈ Γ, where γ :
F ×H → G × p. Then,
Definition 2.1. (Identification). A model (F ,H,Γ) is identified if for every
(F, F ′), (H,H ′) and (γ, γ′), γ(F,H) = γ′(F ′, H ′)⇒ (F,H, γ) = (F ′, H ′, γ′).
The identification argument can be conducted in two steps. First:
Proposition 2.4. The distribution of the ration of uncertainties 1/2 is identified
from the data on bids and win outcomes.
Proof:
P (w1 = 1) = P (b11 > b22) = P
(
2
1
<
b1
b2
)
:= P
(
ξ <
b1
b2
)
= Hξ
(
b1
b2
)
, (2.8)
where I do not condition on bids for simplicity.
Thus the distribution of 1
2
can be identified from observed win outcomes on
the positive support by varying b1/b2.
In the second step, the distribution of ξ is used to recover the value distribution.
Proposition 2.5. 4 Suppose that functions
λ1(bi, N,G,H) ≡ 1
b¯2∫
b2
g2(b2)
1
b2
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db2
and
λ2(bi, N,G,H) ≡ 1
b¯1∫
b1
g1(b1)
b1
b22
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db1
4The formulation of the proposition is similar to Theorem 1 in Guerre et al. (2000).
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are strictly increasing on the support of bids [bi, b¯i] and their inverses are differ-
entiable on the supports of valuations [vi, v¯i]. If Gi(·) are absolutely continuous
probability distributions with support [bi, b¯i], then there exists an absolutely con-
tinuous distribution of bidders’ valuations Fi(·) corresponding to the distribution
of bids. When Fi(·) exists, it is unique with support [vi, v¯i] and satisfies Fi(vi) =
Gi(λ
−1
i (bi, N,G,H)) for all [vi, v¯i]. In addition, λi(bi, N,G,H) is the quasi inverse
of the equilibrium strategy in the sense that λ−1i (bi, N,G,H) = s
−1
i (bi, N, Fi, H)
for all b ∈ [bi, b¯i]. Moreover, the identifying equations can be rewritten in terms
of quantile functions:
q1(t1) =
1
1∫
0
1
r2(t2)
hξ
(
r1(t1)
r2(t2)
)
dt2
(2.9)
and
q2(t2) =
1
1∫
0
r1(t1)
r22(t2)
hξ
(
r1(t1)
r2(t2)
)
dt1
. (2.10)
where t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Similar to Guerre et al. (2000), the identification result is based on the
property that together with the distribution Fi(·) and the density fi(·), the deriva-
tive of the strategy s′i(·) can be canceled out from the differential equation.
Because bi is a function of vi, which is random and distributed as Fi(·), bi is also
random. Let’s denote its distribution Gi(·) and quantile function ri(·) = G−1i (·),
i = 1, 2.
For every b ∈ [bi, b¯i] = [si(vi), si(v¯i)], we have Gi(b) = Pr(bi ≤ b) = Pr(vi ≤
s−1i (b)) = Fi(s
−1
i (b)) = Fi(v), where bi = si(vi). Thus, the distribution Gi(·) is
absolutely continuous, has support [si(vi), si(v¯i)] and density gi(bi) =
fi(vi)
s′i(vi)
, where
vi = s
−1
i (bi).
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This allows us to rewrite the differential equation (2.3) above in terms of the
distribution of bids, that is for the first bidder:
v1 =
1
b¯2∫
b2
g2(b2)
1
b2
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db2
(2.11)
In its turn, the equation (2.4) for the second bidder can be rewritten as:
v2 =
1
b¯1∫
b1
g1(b1)
b1
b22
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db1
(2.12)
Thus equations now express the individual private values vi as functions of the
individual’s equilibrium bids bi, their distributions Gi(·), their densities gi(·), the
density hξ of the ratio of tastes ξ and the number of bidders N .
Let us denote ti = Fi(vi) and tj = Fj(vj), equivalently vi = qi(ti) and vj =
qj(tj), where qi(·) and qj(·) are quantile functions of the distribution of valuations.
As a result of monotonicity of the strategies Gi(si(vi)) = Fi(vi), applying r
−1
i (·)
to both sides of equality, where ri(·) is quantile function of the bid distribution
we get: si(vi) = ri(Fi(vi)) = ri(ti) and sj(vj) = rj(Fj(vj)) = rj(tj). Moreover,
Fj(s
−1
j (si(vi))) = Gj(si(vi)) = Gj(ri(ti)), Fj(v¯j) = 1 and Fj(vj) = 0. Using these
equalities and changing variables we can rewrite the equations (2.11) and (2.12)
above as:
q1(t1) =
1
1∫
0
1
r2(t2)
hξ
(
r1(t1)
r2(t2)
)
dt2
(2.13)
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and
q2(t2) =
1
1∫
0
r1(t1)
r22(t2)
hξ
(
r1(t1)
r2(t2)
)
dt1
, (2.14)
where t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1). This proves the proposition.
Moreover, Proposition 5 can be reformulated in terms of types.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that functions
λc1(bi, N,G,H) ≡
b¯2∫
b2
g2(b2)
1
b2
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db2
and
λc2(bi, N,G,H) ≡
b¯1∫
b1
g1(b1)
b1
b22
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db1
are strictly decreasing on the support of bids [bi, b¯i] and their inverses are dif-
ferentiable on the supports of types [ci, c¯i]. If Gi(·) are absolutely continuous
probability distributions with support [bi, b¯i], then there exists an absolutely con-
tinuous distribution of bidders’ private types Fi(·) corresponding to the distribu-
tion of bids. When Fi(·) exists, it is unique with support [ci, c¯i] and satisfies
Fi(ci) = 1 − Gi((λci)−1(bi, N,G,H)) for all [vi, v¯i]. In addition, λci(bi, N,G,H) is
the quasi inverse of the equilibrium strategy in the sense that (λci)
−1(bi, N,G,H) =
s−1i (bi, N, Fi, H) for all b ∈ [bi, b¯i]. Moreover, the identifying equations can be
rewritten in terms of quantile functions and given by equations:
qc1(1− t1) =
1∫
0
1
r2(t2)
hξ
(
r1(t1)
r2(t2)
)
dt2 (2.15)
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and
qc2(1− t2) =
1∫
0
r1(t1)
r22(t2)
hξ
(
r1(t1)
r2(t2)
)
dt1, (2.16)
where t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Apply Proposition 5 and note ci =
1
vi
, i = 1, 2.
2.4 Nonparametric Estimation
In this section, I propose the asymptotically normal estimators of the density hξ
and bidders’ types.
If we knew the quantile functions ri(·) as well as the distribution of ξ Hξ(·),
then we could use that to recover quantile functions of the bidders’ valuations qi(·).
Let L be the number of auctions, l is the the l-th auction, {bil, i = 1, 2, l = 1, ..., L}
are the observations of the bids, {wil, i = 1, 2, l = 1, ..., L} are the observations of
the winning outcomes.5
In the first step, I estimate the distribution of the 1
2
using kernels from the
observed bids and winning outcomes. Specifically, consider bidder 1 winning prob-
ability:
Hˆξ(b) = Pˆ (w1 = 1|b1/b2 = b) =
L∑
l=1
w1lK
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
)
L∑
l=1
K
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
) , (2.17)
where K(·) is the kernel function and h is the bandwidth.
By taking the derivative with respect to b, we can find the estimator for the
5 I assume that in each auction the same two types of bidders take part. In case when there
are some observable characteristics of the bidders and enough data, the analysis is similar, with
the only difference that we can condition on the observables.
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corresponding density function:
hˆξ(b) = Hˆ
′
ξ(b) =
=
L∑
l=1
w1lK
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
)
·
L∑
l=1
K ′
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
)
−
L∑
l=1
K
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
)
·
L∑
l=1
w1lK
′
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
)
h
[
L∑
l=1
K
(
b1l/b2l−b
h
)]2 .
(2.18)
I use Frchet derivatives to find the asymptotic distribution. In terms of the
density of the observables:
Hξ(b) =
∫
wf(w, b)dw
f(b)
,
where f(w, b) is the density of the vector (w, b) and b = b1/b2. By taking the
derivative with respect to b we get:
hξ(b) =
f(b)
∫
w ∂f(w,b)
∂b
dw − ∂f(b)
∂b
∫
wf(w, b)dw
f(b)2
=
f(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw − f ′(b) ∫ wf(w, b)dw
f(b)2
Assumption 2.7. The data on {bi, wi} is i.i.d.
Assumption 2.8. The density f(b) has compact support, is continuously differ-
entiable of order m ≥ δ+ k, k ≥ 2, with derivatives which are uniformly bounded.
Assumption 2.9. The kernel function is of order δ, it has compact support and
is continuously differentiable on its support.
Assumption 2.10. As L→∞, h→ 0, √Lh3 →∞,
√
Lh3+2k → 0.
Then the following theorem holds:
Theorem 2.1. Given the assumptions about the model as well as that Assump-
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tions 2.7-2.10 are satisfied:
hˆξ(b)
p−→ hξ(b), and
√
Lh3(hˆξ(b)− hξ(b))→ N(0, Vξ),
where
Vξ =
[
P (w = 1|b)(1− P (w = 1|b)))
f 2(b)
] ∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
Proof: In the Appendix.
In its turn, the bid density can be estimated using the kernel estimator as
follows:
gˆi(bi) =
1
Lh
L∑
l=1
K
(bi − bil
h
)
, (2.19)
Then the pseudo-values are estimated using the combination of hˆξ(b) and gˆbi(b):
vˆ1 =
1
¯ˆ
b2∫ˆ
b2
gˆ2(b2)
1
b2
hˆξ
(
b1
b2
)
db2
(2.20)
and
vˆ2 =
1
¯ˆ
b1∫ˆ
b1
gˆ1(b1)
b1
b22
hˆξ
(
b1
b2
)
db1
(2.21)
and pseudo types then are:
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cˆ1 =
¯ˆ
b2∫
bˆ2
gˆ2(b2)
1
b2
hˆξ
(
b1
b2
)
db2 (2.22)
and
cˆ2 =
¯ˆ
b1∫
bˆ1
gˆ1(b1)
b1
b22
hˆξ
(
b1
b2
)
db1 (2.23)
Then the following theorem holds:
Theorem 2.2. Given the assumptions about the model as well as Assumptions
2.71-2.10 are satisfied:
cˆ1(b1)
p−→ c1(b1), and
√
Lh3(cˆ1(b1)− c1(b1))→ N(0, V ),
where
V =
b¯2∫
b2
g22(b2)
1
b22
[
P (w = 1| b1
b2
)(1− P (w = 1| b1
b2
)))
f( b1
b2
)
]
db2 ·
∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
Similarly:
cˆ2(b2)
p−→ c2(b2), and
√
Lh3(cˆ2(b2)− c2(b2))→ N(0, V ),
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where
V =
b¯1∫
b1
g21(b1)
b21
b42
[
P (w = 1| b1
b2
)(1− P (w = 1| b1
b2
)))
f( b1
b2
)
]
db2 ·
∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
Proof: In the Appendix.
ri(·) can be estimated from observed bids:
rˆi(t) = b
(dLte:L)
i , (2.24)
where b
(dse:L)
i is the s-th lowest order statistic out of L i.i.d. bids observations; d·e
is the ceiling function.
In the second step, the quantile functions of the bidder’s valuations are esti-
mated:
qˆ1(t1) =
1
1∫
0
1
rˆ2(t2)
hˆξ
(
rˆ1(t1)
rˆ2(t2)
)
dt2
(2.25)
and
qˆ2(t2) =
1
1∫
0
rˆ1(t1)
rˆ22(t2)
hˆξ
(
rˆ1(t1)
rˆ2(t2)
)
dt1
, (2.26)
where t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1).
Note that the invertibility of the bid function is the key for identification as we
relied on the assumption that the bidders use a strictly increasing bid function.
Similarly, we can estimate the quantile functions of types:
qˆc1(1− t1) =
1∫
0
1
rˆ2(t2)
hˆξ
(
rˆ1(t1)
rˆ2(t2)
)
dt2 (2.27)
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and
qˆc2(1− t2) =
1∫
0
rˆ1(t1)
rˆ22(t2)
hˆξ
(
rˆ1(t1)
rˆ2(t2)
)
dt1, (2.28)
where t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 2.7. (Csorgo (1983)) Let G be a twice differentiable distribution
function, having finite support. Assume inf
0<t<1
g(G−1(t)) > 0 and sup
0<t<1
|g′(G−1(t))| <
∞. Then sup
0<t<1
|rˆ(t)− r(t)| a.s.−−→ 0.
⇒
sup
0<t<1
|rˆ(t)− r(t)| = op(1).
It can be proved that:
Proposition 2.8. Under the same assumptions as above:
qˆi(t)− qi(t) = op(1),
i = 1, 2.
2.5 Monte Carlo Simulations
Example 2.1. If the true quantile functions qi, i = 1, 2 of the bidder’s valuations
are
q1(t1) =
1− k
k
ck2c
1−k
1 t
1−k
1 , q2(t2) =
1 + k
k
ck+12 c
−k
1 t
1+k
2 t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1),
and the distribution of ξ is Beta-distribution: hξ(x) = kx
k−1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 <
k < 1, then there exist unique equilibrium bid functions s1(v1) = c1F1(v1) and
c2(v) = k2F2(v) for any c1 and c2.
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Let’s consider L = 200 auctions with 2 bidders and 100 Monte Carlo replica-
tions. Then the following Figure 2.1 below presents the true quantile function,
the mean, the 5% quantile, and the 95% quantile of the 100 estimates qˆ1(t) and
qˆ2(t) for c1 = 4, c2 = 2 and k = 0.2.
Figure 2.1: Results of Monte Carlo simulations
2.6 Application: U.S. House of Representatives
The theory described in the previous sections can be applied to quantify the
incumbency advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives elections. Moreover,
the model provides a method to separate the advantage into two parts. The first
advantage is due to the better reputation of the Incumbent. It is characterized by
the fact that even when both the Incumbent and the Challenger spend the same
amount of money on their campaign, the probability that the Incumbent wins
is estimated to be bigger than that of the Challenger. This probability is given
by the P (ξ < 1), which is determined by the distribution of uncertainty. In its
turn, the second advantage is due to the difference in campaign financing, which
is characterized by the difference in the quantile functions of candidates’ types,
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where the type describes how costly is it for the candidate to raise money. I show
that the Incumbent has a lower type and thus has better campaign financing. The
important difference between these two advantages is that only the latter can be
influenced by the policymakers, whereas the reputation can not. Thus it is crucial
for policy implications to be able to distinguish and quantify them.
2.6.1 U.S. House Elections: Incumbents vs. Challengers
I use the data from U.S. House of Representatives elections.6 These elections
happen every two years. Currently, there are 435 voting seats; winners serve 2-year
terms. To quantify the incumbency advantage, I use the data on 6578 Incumbent-
Challenger elections during the 1972-2016 period. All the Incumbent’s and the
Challenger’s expenditures are in $2016. The summary statistics is presented in
Table 2.1 below. Incumbents won in 93.8% of contests. On average, Incumbents
spend 2.5 times as much as the Challenger. Throughout the observed period,
expenditures are increasing with only a slight decline starting in 2010. Please see
Figure 2.2 below.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the Incumbent-Challenger elections
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Incumbent’s Expenditures 6578 1057.67 1044.42 .198 26859.96
Challenger’s Expenditures 6578 401.08 698.81 .002 10839.82
Vote share for Incumbent 6562 64.17 9.12 34.13 94.66
Incumbent winning dummy 6578 .938 .240 0 1
* Expenditures are in thousands of dollars
6I am very grateful to Gary Jacobson, Professor of Political Science at the University of
California, San Diego, for providing me with his data.
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Figure 2.2: Average expenditures by election cycle
Thus we observe the data on 6578 auctions with two bidders each, and winning
outcomes, where bidders are candidates and bids are expenditures.
The first step is the estimation of the distribution of uncertainty ξ using equa-
tions (2.17) and (2.18) above. The normal kernel and the optimal bandwidth are
used. The results are shown below in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Cumulative distribution function Hξ(·)
b 1 2 3 4 5 7 7
Hˆξ(b) 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.98 1.00
Here b represents the ratio of the Incumbent’s and the Challenger’s bids. If
b = 1, expenditures are equal, and Hξ(·) represents the winning probability of the
Incumbent in this case. Thus the first incumbency advantage is represented by
85% winning probability even in the case when the expenditures are the same.
The second step is the estimation of quantile functions of types. We start with
the estimation of the quantile function of bids using equation (2.24) and then
54
plug the estimates into equations (2.27) and (2.28) to find the quantile functions
of types.
Figure 2.3 represents the results of the model estimation.7 I divide all election
cycles by decades. The result reflects the Incumbent’s advantage in campaign
financing as the Challenger’s type first-order stochastically dominates the Incum-
bent’s type distribution.
Figure 2.3: Estimated Quantile Functions of Types by Decade
7On the boundaries, the quantile functions were monotonized as the kernel estimators tend
to be biased close to the boundaries.
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I also present the change of the quantile functions over the decades in Figure
2.4 below.
Figure 2.4: Estimated Quantile Functions of Types over Decades
We can also estimate the Incumbent’s and the Challenger’s valuation quantile
functions instead. See Figure 2.5 below.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Quantile Functions of Valuations
2.6.2 Counterfactuals
Once the primitives of the model – such as the distribution of uncertainty and
the type distributions – are estimated, researches have the capability to run the
counterfactual simulations. Counterfactuals allow testing different ways to limit
the incumbency advantage. Limiting the incumbency advantage is important for
the following reasons. First, according to the prevalent opinion in political science,
57
democracy is not possible without sufficient competition as well as the turnover
of the seats in Congressional elections. Moreover, the increased total campaign
spending is costly for society. Thus it would be useful to consider the policy
that reduces the Incumbent’s winning probability, as well as the total campaign
spending.
Two well-known policies are the limit on expenditures and public campaign
financing. According to Jacobson (1978): ”Even though Incumbents raise money
more easily from all sources, limits on contributions will not help Challengers be-
cause the problem is not equalizing spending between candidates but rather simply
getting more money to Challengers so that they can mount competitive races.”
The reason behind that statement is that the marginal effect of the Challenger’s
expenditure on the probability to win is greater than that of the Incumbent.
Although that is true, this logic doesn’t take into account the underlying game
between the Incumbent and the Challenger. In reality, as the Challenger increases
expenditures, the low-type Incumbent also does so, and as a result, the effect on
winning probability is uncertain.
Let us consider two policies, one by one and compare the conclusions.
2.6.2.1 Public Campaign Financing
First, I consider public campaign financing for the Challenger, which lowers his
type’s distribution. I quantify the effect of the limit case of the public financing
of the Challengers such that the resulting type quantile function matches one of
the Incumbents. This case eliminates the advantage due to the difference in types
completely, since now the types are assumed to be the same.
I take the equal quantile functions of the Incumbent and the Challenger as
given. The goal is to find the optimal strategies of the players using the equations
(2.27) and (2.28) and solving the inverse problem of finding rˆ1(·) and rˆ2(·) from
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the qˆ1(·) and qˆ2(·). I do that by approximating the bid quantile function by the
exponential distribution − log(1−t)
λ
. After that, I calculate the Incumbent’s winning
probability knowing the bid strategies and the distribution of uncertainty. Results
are presented in Figure 2.3 below.
Table 2.3: Public campaign financing: resulting winning probability
Incumbent’s probability of winning
All 72-80 82-90 92-2000 2002-2016
Original 0.938 0.929 0.953 0.941 0.935
With challenger’s financing 0.896 0.907 0.917 0.895 0.847
Decrease 0.042 0.22 0.36 0.046 0.088
The Incumbent’s winning probability decreases by 4.2% from 93.8% to 89.6%.
Moreover, the reform leads to the increase in expenditures of both candidates,
see Table 2.4 below:
Table 2.4: Public campaign financing: resulting expenditures
All 72-80 82-90 92-2000 2002-2016
Mean of incumbent’s expenditures
Original 1057 394 792 1110 1650
With challenger’s financing 1623 512 1092 1597 3381
Increase 566 118 300 487 1731
Mean of challenger’s expenditures
Original 401 243 309 420 557
With challenger’s financing 997 329 721 1073 1976
Increase 596 86 412 653 1419
* Expenditures are in thousands of $
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2.6.2.2 Limit on Expenditure
The other popular policy is the limit on expenditure. I consider such a case that
both candidates spend the same amount. Thus I do not allow the Incumbent
to spend more than the Challenger. In this case, b1 = b2 and the Incumbent’s
winning probability becomes:
P (b11 > b22) = P (1 > 2) = P (2/1 < 1) = Hξ(1)
Using this formula and equation (2.17), I estimate the winning probability. Results
are presented in Table 2.5 below.
Table 2.5: Limit on expenditure results
Incumbent probability of winning
All 72-80 82-90 92-2000 2002-2016
Original 0.938 0.929 0.953 0.941 0.935
With the expenditure constraint 0.851 0.873 0.885 0.852 0.789
Decrease 0.087 0.056 0.068 0.089 0.146
It can be seen that the Incumbent’s winning probability drops by 8.7% from
93.8% to 85.1%, a bigger change than with public campaign financing for the
Challenger.
In conclusion, the Challenger’s public financing is not as effective as the limit
on expenditures in terms of both lowering the Incumbent’s winning probability
as well as on the total campaign spending. Thus by taking into account the
game structure of the model, I have shown that the predictions change once the
game-theoretical structure of the interactions between the candidates is taken into
account.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this work, I identified and estimated the incomplete information contest with
nonparametric contest success function. As a result, I recovered the distribution
of valuations or, alternatively, types from the bid distributions and win outcomes.
Here types characterize how costly it is to raise the bid and is just the inverse
of the valuation. This model provides the framework that can be applied to the
variety of real-life scenarios such as marketing and advertising by firms, litigation,
research and development, patent race, procurement of innovative good, research
contests, sports events, arms race, rent-seeking activity, such as lobbying, as well
as electoral competition. I apply the model to the U.S. House of Representatives
elections, which were also studied by He and Huang (2018) in the case of Tullock
contest. The model results show the incumbency advantage and can distinguish
the two sources of it. Moreover, the decrease in how costly is it to raise money for
the election over decades is observed. The knowledge of the types’ distributions
allows quantifying the effect of different policy changes such as limits on expendi-
tures or funding for Challengers in order to eliminate incumbency advantage. By
comparing these two policies, I found the former to be more effective.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof: In case when both i and j have exponential distribution with parameter
λ = 1, f(t) = e
−t and in its turn F(t) = 1− e−t. As a result:
P (w1 = 1| b1, b2) = P (x1 > x2 | b1, b2) = P (b11 > b22 | b1, b2) =
= P (2 <
b1
b2
1 | b1, b2) =
+∞∫
0
F
(
b1
b2
t
)
f(t)dt =
+∞∫
0
(
1− e−
b1
b2
t
)
e−tdt =
= 1− 1
1 + b1
b2
=
b1
b1 + b2
which is the contest success function of the well-known Tullock contest.
2.8.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof: Let us consider all assumptions required for the Theorem 6 in Athey (2001)
to hold.
1. fi(·) is density with respect to Lebesque measure, bounded and atomless.
2. Ui = pi(b1, b2)(vi − bi) + (1 − pi(b1, b2))(−bi) can be written in the general
form considered in the paper.
3. Winner’s payoff vi − bi and loser’s payoff −bi are continuous in (vi, b) and
bounded as vi has a finite support [vi, v¯i] and the bidders won’t find it
profitable to bid more than the valuation.
4. Expected utility E[Ui] =
∫
pi(bi, sj(vj))fj(vj)dvj − bi is bounded and finite.
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5. Single-crossing condition ∂
2Ui
∂vi∂bi
≥ 0 is satisfied as:
∂2U1
∂v1∂b1
=
∂P1
∂b1
=
1
b1
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
> 0,
∂2U2
∂v2∂b2
=
∂P2
∂b2
=
b1
b22
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
> 0.
Thus all the assumptions of Theorem 6 in Athey (2001) are satisfied, hence there
exists a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in nondecreasing strategies.
Since the single-crossing property holds with strict inequality, this equilibrium
is actually in increasing strategies.
2.8.3 Proof of Example 2.1
Proof: Given that the distribution of ξ is Beta-distribution: hξ(x) = kx
k−1, 0 ≤
x ≤ 1, 0 < k < 1, an equation (2.3) can be rewritten as
v1 =
1
v¯2∫
v2
1
s2(v2)
k s1(v1)
k−1
s2(v2)k−1
dF2(v2)
=
1
ks1(v1)k−1
v¯2∫
v2
s2(v2)−kdF2(v2)
In its turn, equation (2.4) becomes:
v2 =
1
v¯1∫
v1
s1(v1)
s22(v2)
k s1(v1)
k−1
s2(v2)k−1
dF1(v1)
=
1
ks2(v2)−k−1
v¯1∫
v1
s1(v1)kdF1(v1)
If we plug in s1(v1) = c1F1(v1) and s2(v2) = c2F2(v2) we get:
v1 =
1
k(c1F1(v1))k−1
v¯2∫
v2
(c2F2(v2))−kdF2(v2)
=
1
k
1−k
ck−11
ck2
(F1(v1))k−1
,
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similarly
v2 =
1
k(c2F2(v2))−k−1
v¯1∫
v1
(c1F1(v1))kdF1(v1)
=
1
k
1+k
ck1
ck+12
(F2(v2))−k−1
.
In terms of quantile functions this can be written as:
q1(t1) =
1− k
k
ck2c
1−k
1 t
1−k
1 , q2(t2) =
1 + k
k
ck+12 c
−k
1 t
1+k
2 t1, t2 ∈ (0, 1),
where q1 = F
−1
1 and q2 = F
−1
2 .
2.8.4 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof: First, we would like to estimate hξ(b) - the derivative of
Hξ(b) =
∫
wf(w, b)dw
f(b)
.
By taking the derivative with respect to b we get:
hξ(b) = Φ(f) =
f(b)
∫
w ∂f(w,b)
∂b
dw − ∂f(b)
∂b
∫
wf(w, b)dw
f(b)2
=
f(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw − f ′(b) ∫ wf(w, b)dw
f(b)2
Φ(f + h) =
=
[f(b) + h(b)]
∫
w[f ′(w, b) + h′(w, b)]dw − [f ′(b) + h′(b)] ∫ w[f(w, b) + h(w, b)]dw
[f(b) + h(b)]2
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Φ(f + h)− Φ(f) =
f(b)2[f(b) + h(b)]
∫
w[f ′(w, b) + h′(w, b)]dw
f(b)2[f(b) + h(b)]2
−
f(b)2[f ′(b) + h′(b)]
∫
w[f(w, b) + h(w, b)]dw
f(b)2[f(b) + h(b)]2
+
−f(b)[f(b) + h(b)]2 ∫ wf ′(w, b)dw
f(b)2[f(b) + h(b)]2
+
f ′(b)[f(b) + h(b)]2
∫
wf(w, b)dw
f(b)2[f(b) + h(b)]2
Num = f 3(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw + f 3(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw+
+f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw + f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw−
−f 2(b)f ′(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw − f 2(b)f ′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw−
−f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw−
−f 3(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw − 2f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw−
−f(b)h2(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw + f ′(b)f 2(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw+
+2f ′(b)f(b)h(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw + f ′(b)h2(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw =
f 3(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw+
+f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw − f 2(b)f ′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw−
−f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw−
−f(b)h2(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw + 2f ′(b)f(b)h(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw+
+f ′(b)h2(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw = Q+ P,
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Where:
Q = f 3(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw−
−f 2(b)f ′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw+
+2f ′(b)f(b)h(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw
P = f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw−
−f(b)h2(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw + f ′(b)h2(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw
Moreover:
1
f 2(f + h)2
=
1
f 4
+
1
f 2(f + h)2
− 1
f 4
=
1
f 4
− 2hf + h
2
f 4(f + h)2
As a result:
Φ(f + h)− Φ(f) =
=
Q
f 4(b)
+
P
f 4(b)
− Q(2h(b)f(b) + h
2(b))
f 4(b)(f(b) + h(b))2
− P (2h(b)f(b) + h
2(b))
f 4(b)(f(b) + h(b))2
= DΦ(f, h) +RΦ(f, h),
Where:
DΦ(f, h) =
Q
f 4(b)
RΦ(f, h) =
P
f 4(b)
− Q(2h(b)f(b) + h
2(b))
f 4(b)(f(b) + h(b))2
− P (2h(b)f(b) + h
2(b))
f 4(b)(f(b) + h(b))2
.
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Thus, for some constant A <∞:
|DΦ(f, h)| < A||h|| and |RΦ(f, h)| < A||h||2.
Using Newey (1994), Lemma 5.3: ||h|| p−→ 0. And thus,
sup|Φ(f + h)− Φ(f)| ≤ A||h||+ a||h||2 p−→ 0.
Now let us derive the asymptotic distribution.
Q = f 3(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h(b)
∫
wf ′(w, b)dw−
−f 2(b)f ′(b)
∫
wh(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw+
+2f ′(b)f(b)h(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw
In its turn,
f(b) =
∫
f(w, b)dw.
Thus
Q = f 3(b)
∫
wh′(w, b)dw − f 2(b)h′(b)
∫
wf(w, b)dw + T =
= f 3(b)
∫
w(fˆ ′(w, b)− f ′(w, b))dw−
−f 2(b)
∫
((fˆ ′(w, b)− f ′(w, b))dw)
∫
wf(w, b)dw + T =
=
∫
f 2(b)
[
wf(b)−
∫
wf(w, b)dw
]
(fˆ ′(w, b)− f ′(w, b))dw + T,
where T depends only on h, but not h′. Thus the terms in T converge faster than
the ones that depend on the derivative estimate.
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As a result,
D =
∫ [
wf(b)− ∫ wf(w, b)dw
f 2(b)
]
(fˆ ′(w, b)− f ′(w, b))dw + T.
Using Newey (1994), Lemma 5.3, we find that
√
Lh3(Φ(f + h)− Φ(f))→ N (0, Vξ) ,
where
Vξ =
∫ [
wf(b)−
∫
wf(w, b)dw
]2
f(w, b)
f 4(b)
dw
∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du.
As w can only take 2 values 0 and 1:
∫
wf(w, b)dw = f(1, b) and
Vξ =
[
f(1, b)2f(0, b) + f(0, b)2f(1, b)
f 4(b)
] ∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du =
=
[
f(1, b)f(0, b)
f 3(b)
] ∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
Moreover,
f(1, b) = f(b)P (w = 1|b) and
f(0, b) = f(b)P (w = 0|b) = f(b)(1− P (w = 1|b)),
thus
Vξ =
[
P (w = 1|b)(1− P (w = 1|b)))
f(b)
] ∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
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And as a result,
hˆξ(b)→ hξ(b) in probability, and
√
Lh3(hˆξ(b)− hξ(b))→ N(0, Vξ),
where
Vξ =
[
P (w = 1|b)(1− P (w = 1|b)))
f 2(b)
] ∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
.
2.8.5 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof: Now let us denote by f˜(w, b1, b2) the joint density of the vector (w, b1, b2)
and consider:
c1 = 1/v1 =
b¯2∫
b2
g2(b2)
1
b2
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
db2 := Φ˜(b1; f)
We also denote:
hξ
(
b1
b2
)
:= φ(b1, b2; f˜)
g2(b2)
1
b2
:= ψ(b2; f˜)
Then
Φ˜(b1; f˜) =
b¯2∫
b2
ψ(b2; f˜)φ(b1, b2; f˜)db2
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It follows that:
Φ˜(b1; f˜ + h˜)− Φ˜(b1; f˜) =
b¯2∫
b2
ψ(b2; f˜ + h˜)φ(b1, b2; f˜ + h˜)db2 −
b¯2∫
b2
ψ(b2; f˜)φ(b1, b2; f˜)db2
=
b¯2∫
b2
φ(b1, b2; f˜)Dψ(b1, b2; f˜)db2 +
b¯2∫
b2
Dψ(b2; f˜)φ(b1, b2; f˜)db2 + the rest =
=
b¯2∫
b2
∫
w
g2(b2)
1
b2
[
wf(b)− ∫ wf(w, b)dw
f 2(b)
]
(fˆ ′(w, b)− f ′(w, b))dwdb2 + the rest,
where b = b1/b2.
The rest converges faster as the rate of convergence of fˆ ′(w, b) is slower than
that of fˆ(w, b).
Thus:
cˆ1(b1)→ c1(b1) in probability, and
√
Lh3(cˆ1(b1)− c1(b1))→ N(0, V ),
where
V =
b¯2∫
b2
g22(b2)
1
b22
[
P (w = 1| b1
b2
)(1− P (w = 1| b1
b2
)))
f( b1
b2
)
]
db2 ·
∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
Similarly:
cˆ2(b2)→ c2(b2) in probability, and
√
Lh3(cˆ2(b2)− c2(b2))→ N(0, V ),
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where
V =
b¯1∫
b1
g21(b1)
b21
b42
[
P (w = 1| b1
b2
)(1− P (w = 1| b1
b2
)))
f( b1
b2
)
]
db2 ·
∫ (
∂K(u)
∂u
)2
du
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CHAPTER 3
Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of
a Serial Contest
3.1 Introduction
In this work, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimator of a
contest model where an object is allocated according to the allocation rule de-
termined by the serial contest success function (CSF). Every bidder pays his bid
regardless of whether he wins or not. The model is a game of incomplete infor-
mation in the sense that the bidders do not observe the other bidders’ valuations,
but the distribution of the valuations is common knowledge. Identification and
estimation of the model primitives is a crucial part of any policy intervention.
Similar to Guerre et al. (2000) and He and Huang (2018) I propose a method that
allows the researcher to estimate the distribution of bidders’ valuations using the
data on their bids. This method does not require any parametric assumptions,
nor does it require Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy computation, which makes
the method computationally attractive.
The contest is a natural model of costly competition as it describes situations
where all players exert costly effort to achieve some goal (win the contest). This
is sunk cost, in the sense that it is paid no matter whether a player wins or loses.
Such interactions include a wide range of scenarios such as marketing and adver-
tising by firms (Bell et al. (1975)), litigation (Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), Baye
et al. (2005)); research and development, patent race, procurement of innovative
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good, research contests ( Taylor (1995), Che and Gale (2003)); sports events, arms
race and rent-seeking activity, such as lobbying (Tullock (1980), Krueger (1974),
Baye et al. (1993)). Electoral competition was also modeled using contest theory
since the 1990s, see, for example, Baron (1994), Snyder (1989), or Skaperdas and
Grofman (1995).
The contest is determined by the contest success function, which is the function
that maps bidders’ efforts to the win probability. See the survey by Konrad
(2009) for an extensive discussion of different types of contests.1 The probability
of winning satisfies some standard assumptions which are described in detail in
Section 2. Depending on the application, different contest success functions are
more reasonable to use. In this work, the contest with serial CSF is considered.
It was introduced by Alcalde and Dahm (2007), and the main characteristic of
this contest is that the win probability depends on the percentage mark-up. The
serial contest success function has several advantages over the other widely used
CSF such as Tullock (1980) CSF, for which win probability depends on the ratio
of the bids, and Hirshleifer (1989) CSF for which win probability depends on the
difference of the bids. Compared to the Tullock’s contest success function, serial
CSF depends not only on the relative bids but also on the absolute differences
of bids. In the case of election campaign spending, for instance, it is plausible
to think that the difference in spendings matter. For instance, the difference
between bids of 10 and 30 thousand dollars might be more impactful than the
difference between the bids of 1000 and 3000. On the other hand, with respect to
the Hirshleifer’s difference-form contests, the serial contest weakens the absolute
criterion in the mapping from bids to winning probability and, most importantly,
it is homogeneous in bids. The last property is crucial for the applications in
which the bid is the expenditure, as we would like to have the property that
1All-pay auction is an extreme case of the contest model when the bidder with the highest
bid wins, thus the winning probability is one if and only if the bidder has the highest bid. In
reality, in the scenarios described above it is common that the contestant with the highest bid
can still lose, thus it is important to consider contests for empirical applications.
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the win probability does not depend on the units of measurement (like dollars or
thousands of dollars).
Most of the theoretical papers on contests and auctions consider games with
complete information in the sense that players observe each other’s valuations.
In reality, it is more plausible to think that the bidders do not observe the pri-
vate information of the other bidders. Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010) and Ewerhart
(2014) are a few of the papers providing the existence of equilibrium results in the
context of the incomplete information contests. The literature on nonparamet-
ric identification and estimation of incomplete information auctions and contests
is very sparse. There is a block of papers on the first-price auctions originated
from Guerre et al. (2000). In my previous research project, I considered all-pay
auctions (an extreme case of a contest). The only two papers that consider the
identification and estimation of a contest as a game with incomplete information
are He and Huang (2018) and my project on nonparametric identification and
estimation of the contest model with uncertainty. He and Huang (2018) consider
the case when the contest success function has the Tullock’s form. In my project,
which is presented in Chapter 2, I consider the nonparametric representation of
the contest success function. But in the case when the data is sparse, we would
need to put some restrictions on the nonparametric structure. Thus, one of the
possibilities would be to assume the specific CSF and in this work, I discuss the
case of the serial contest success function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the
symmetric contest model with serial CSF. The nonparametric identification and
estimation, as well as the Monte Carlo simulations, are discussed in detail. Section
3 considers the asymmetric setting. Similarly, identification analysis, estimation
procedure as well as the Monte Carlo simulations are presented. Section 4 con-
cludes.
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3.2 Symmetric Contest Model
3.2.1 Notations and Definitions
In this work, I consider a contest model with N = 2 risk-neutral bidders. The
model can be easily extended to account for the arbitrary number of bidders.
Assumption 3.1. Each bidder has a private valuation of the good vi, i = 1, 2,
which is his private information. He draws this valuation vi from the distribution
F (v) with support [v, v¯], density f and quantile function q = F−1 independently
from the other bidders.
Assumption 3.2. When bidders simultaneously submit their bids bi they know
the number of bidders, their own valuations vi and F (v).
Thus this is a game with incomplete information.
Assumption 3.3. Each of the bidders pays bi, regardless of whether or not he
obtains a good.
The winner is determined according to the contest success function Ψ.
Definition 3.1. (CSF) A contest success function is a mapping
Ψ : RN+ → ∆N ,
such that for each b = (b1, ..., bN) ∈ RN+ , Ψ(b) is in the N−1 dimensional simplex,
i.e. Ψ(b) is such that, for each i, Ψi(b) ≥ 0, and
∑N
i=1 Ψi(b) = 1.
Ψ satisfies the following assumptions:
Monotonicity: Ψi(bi, b−i) is weakly increasing in bi, for any b−i ∈ RN−1+ , and
any i ∈ 1, ..., N ;
Zero bids: Ψi(0, b−i) = 0 for any b−i 6= 0, and any i ∈ 1, ..., N ; moreover,
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Ψi(bi, b−i) > 0 for any bi > 0, and any i ∈ 1, ..., N ;
Anonymity: Ψi(b) = Ψi(bφ(1), ..., bφ(N)) for any permutation φ : 1, ..., N →
1, ..., N , any b ∈ RN+ , and any i ∈ 1, ..., N ;
Smoothness: Ψi is continuous on RN+\{0}, for any i ∈ 1, ..., N ; moreover, the
partial derivative ∂Ψi(bi,b−i)
∂bi
exists and is continuous in b−i, for any bi > 0, and any
i ∈ 1, ..., N .
Given the contest success function Ψ, the expected payoff to bidder i partici-
pating in the contest, is given by:
E[ui|vi, N, F (v)] = viE[Ψi(bi, b−i)|bi, N, F (v)]− bi.
The final payoff to the bidder i is vi − bi if he wins, and −bi if he looses.
In this work, I consider the contest with serial CSF. It was introduced by
Alcalde and Dahm (2007). The main characteristic of this type of contests is that
the win probabilities depend on the percentage mark-up.
Definition 3.2. (Serial CSF) If b is an ordered vector of bids such that b1 ≥ b2 ≥
... ≥ bn ≥ 0, then the serial CSF with economies of scale parameter α ≥ 0 assigns
for all bidders i:
Ψi(b) =
n∑
j=i
bαj − bαj+1
j · bα1
,
with bn+1 = 0. If b is degenerated, then fair lottery takes place.
The class of serial contest success functions can also be defined recursively as
follows:
Ψi(b) = Ψi+1(b) +
bαi − bαi+1
i · bα1
, Ψn(b) =
bαn
n · bα1
.
As in the paper I consider 2 bidder case, the CSF takes the following form.
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Assumption 3.4. The winning probability is given by:
Ψi(bi, bj) =

1
2
(
bi
bj
)α
, if bi ≤ bj
1− 1
2
(
bj
bi
)α
, if bi ≥ bj,
where i, j = 1, 2.
In case when α = 1:
Ψi(bi, bj) =
 12 −
bj−bi
2bj
, if bi ≤ bj
1
2
+
bi−bj
2bi
, if bi ≥ bj.
In its turn, the extreme case when α =∞ is equivalent to the all-pay auction:
Ψi(bi, bj) =
 0, if bi ≤ bj1, if bi ≥ bj.
Below is shown the contest success function (the win probability) of the first
bidder once the bid of the second bidder b2 is fixed at the value 1 for different
values of the parameter α.
Figure 3.1: Serial contest success function of bidder 1
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3.2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Given Assumptions 3.1-3.4 the expected utility of player i can be written in the
following way:
E[ui(v)|vi, F (v)] = viE[Ψi(b, b−i)|b, vi, N, F (v)]− bi =
vi
[∫ b¯
bi
1
2
(
bi
bj
)α
dG(bj) +
∫ bi
b
(
1− 1
2
(
bj
bi
)α)
dG(bj)
]
− bi,
where i = 1, 2, j = −i. The final payoff to the bidder i is vi − bi if he obtains a
good, and −bi if he does not obtain a good.
I consider the Bayesian equilibrium in this incomplete information game which
is symmetric and strictly monotonic. The existence can be proved using Athey
(2001) Theorem 6.
Proposition 3.1. Given Assumptions 3.1-3.4 there exists a pure strategy increas-
ing BNE of the incomplete information game formulated above.
Proof. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
For each valuation, the corresponding bid is defined by the function s(v) = b
that is the equilibrium bid strategy which maximizes the bidder’s expected payoff.
s(v) is invertible and s−1(b) = v given that it is strictly monotonic.
Proposition 3.2. Given Assumptions 3.1-3.4 as well as the assumption of strict
monotonicity of the bidding strategies the first-order conditions of this game can
be written as:
vi =
1
α
2
[s(vi)α−1
∫ v¯
vi
s(vj)−αdF (vj) + s(vi)−α−1
∫ vi
v
s(vj)αdF (vj)]
, (3.1)
where i = 1, 2, j = −i.
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Proof: The expected payoff to bidder i when his true valuation is vi but he bids
as if it was v can be written as follows:
E[ui(v)|vi, F (v)] = viE[Ψi(b, b−i)|b, v,N, F (v)]− b =
= vi
[∫ b¯
b
1
2
(
b
bj
)α
dG(bj) +
∫ b
b
(
1− 1
2
(
bj
b
)α)
dG(bj)
]
− b =
= vi
[∫ v¯
v
1
2
(
s(v)
s(vj)
)α
dF (vj) +
∫ v
v
(
1− 1
2
(
s(vj)
s(v)
)α)
dF (vj)
]
− s(v) =
= vi
[
1
2
s(v)α
∫ v¯
v
s(vj)
−αdF (vj)− 1
2
s(v)−α
∫ v
v
s(vj)
αdF (vj) + F (v)
]
− s(v),
since b = s(v) and G(b) = Pr(bi ≤ b) = Pr(vi ≤ s−1(b)) = F (s−1(b)) = F (v) as
s(v) is invertible.
Using the first order condition (FOC) (differentiating with respect to v and
substituting v = vi), we get:
∂E[ui]
∂v
= vi[
1
2
αs(v)α−1s′(v)
∫ v¯
v
s(vj)
−αdF (vj)− 1
2
s(v)αs(v)−αf(v)+
1
2
αs(v)−α−1s′(v)
∫ v
v
s(vj)
αdF (vj)− 1
2
s(v)−αs(v)αf(v) + f(v)]− s′(v) = 0,
when v = vi.
From the differential equation above we obtain the following equation on the
valuation and the strategy:
vi =
1
α
2
[s(vi)α−1
∫ v¯
vi
s(vj)−αdF (vj) + s(vi)−α−1
∫ vi
v
s(vj)αdF (vj)]
.
In the model, the bids are observed from the data whereas the valuations are
unknown for the econometrician. Thus, to be able to recover the valuations we
should be able to eliminate both F (·) as well as s(·) from the write hand side of
the equation (3.1) and represent it as a function of bids. The method is presented
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in the next section.
3.2.3 Nonparametric Identification
In this section, I prove that the parameters of the model are nonparametrically
identified from available data.
The only unknown ingredient of the model is the distribution of valuations
F (·), the number of bidders as well as the bids bi, i = 1, 2, are observed. As a
result, the question of identification boils down to the question of whether the
distribution F can be uniquely recovered from observed bids.
Let’s denote the distribution of bi by G(·) and quantile function r(·) = G−1(·).
Note that the distribution G(·) of bi depends on the underlying distribution F (·)
not only through vi, but also through the equilibrium strategy s(·).
Formally, let G denote the set of all distributions over the space of permitted
bids, F ∈ F . Let’s call the mapping from the private information to bids γ ∈ Γ,
where γ : F → G. Then,
Definition 3.3. (Identification). A model (F ,Γ) is identified if for every (F, F ′) ∈
F2 and (γ, γ′) ∈ Γ2 , γ(F ) = γ′(F ′)⇒ (F, γ) = (F ′, γ′).
Proposition 3.3. Given Assumptions 3.1-3.4 are satisfied and F (v) is continuous
and strictly increasing on [v, v¯], the quantile function of valuations is nonparamet-
rically identified:
q(t) =
1
α
2
[r(t)α−1
1∫
t
r(tj)−αdtj + r(t)−α−1
t∫
0
r(tj)αdtj]
, t ∈ (0, 1). (3.2)
Proof: As it was shown above for every b ∈ [b, b¯] = [s(v), s(v¯)]: G(b) = F (v),
where b = s(v), thus G(s(v)) = F (v). Let r(t) = G−1(t) and q(t) = F−1(t), where
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t ∈ (0, 1). Then by changing variables (applying r to both sides of equation):
G(s(v)) = F (v)⇔ s(v) = r(F (v)).
Moreover, v = q(t), where t = F (v).
Substituting the above expressions into the equation (3.1), we can rewrite the
equation for the quantile function of valuations in terms of the quantile function
of bids:
q(t) =
1
α
2
[r(t)α−1
1∫
t
r(tj)−αdtj + r(t)−α−1
t∫
0
r(tj)αdtj]
, t ∈ (0, 1).
This proves the proposition.
3.2.4 Nonparametric Estimation
In this section, I propose the nonparametric estimators of the quantile function
of bidders’ valuations.
If we knew the quantile function r(t), then we could use that to recover the
quantile function of the bidders valuation q(t). r(t) is unknown, but can be
estimated from observed bids:
rˆ(t) = b(dnte:n),
where b(dse:n) is the s-th lowest order statistic out of n i.i.d. bids observations and
d·e is the ceiling function.
Let L be the number of auctions, l is the l-th auction, {bil, i = 1, 2, l = 1, ..., L}
are the observations. Then we can estimate the quantile function of valuations by
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plugging-in the estimators of quantile function of the bids into equation (3.2):
qˆ(t) =
1
α
2
[rˆ(t)α−1
1∫
t
rˆ(tj)−αdtj + rˆ(t)−α−1
t∫
0
rˆ(tj)αdtj]
, t ∈ (0, 1). (3.3)
Note that the invertibility of the bid function is the key for identification as
we relied heavily on the assumption that the bidders use a strictly increasing bid
function.
Proposition 3.4. (Csorgo (1983)) Let G be a twice differentiable distribution
function, having finite support. Assume inf
0<t<1
g(G−1(t)) > 0 and sup
0<t<1
|g′(G−1(t))| <
∞. Then sup
0<t<1
|rˆ(t)− r(t)| a.s.−−→ 0.
⇒
sup
0<t<1
|rˆ(t)− r(t)| = op(1).
It can be proved that:
Proposition 3.5. Under the same assumptions as above:
qˆ(t)− q(t) = op(1).
Moreover, in case α is not known it can be estimated from the observed bids
and win outcomes. As the CSF is:
Ψi(bi, bj) =

1
2
(
bi
bj
)α
, if bi ≤ bj
1− 1
2
(
bj
bi
)α
, if bi ≥ bj,
where i, j = 1, 2, and it describes the
probability of winning, thus α can be estimates using the Maximum Likelihood
Estimator as the first step of the estimation procedure.
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3.2.5 Monte Carlo Simulations
To analyze the performance of the estimator (3.3) I will run the Monte Carlo
Simulations.
Example 3.1. If the distribution of valuations is
F (v) =
(
1 +
α− 1
α + 1
− α− 1
α
2k
v
) 1
α−1
, v ∈ [v, v¯], α 6= 1,
or equivalently if quantile function q of the valuations is
q(t) =
1
α
2k(1−α)(t
α−1 − 1) + α
2k(1+α)
, t ∈ (0, 1), α 6= 1.
q(0) = k(1+α)(α−1)
α2
= v and q(1) = 2k(α+1)
α
= v¯. Then there exists a unique
equilibrium bid function s(v) = kF (v), where v ∈ [v, v¯] for any k.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Let’s consider L = 200 auctions with 2 bidders and 100 Monte Carlo replica-
tions. Then the following figure presents the true quantile function, the mean, the
5% quantile, and the 95% quantile of the 100 estimates qˆ(t) for k = 2 and α = 3.
Figure 3.2: Monte Carlo results in case of symmetric bidders
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As we see the estimator works very well in this case, the only issue might occur
at the border since the quantile estimates are biased closed to the borders.
3.3 Asymmetric Contest Model
3.3.1 Nonparametric Identification
In this section, I prove the nonparametric identification of the model with asym-
metric bidders.
I consider the case when bidders are asymmetric in a sense that they have dif-
ferent distributions of the valuations: Fi(·), i = 1, 2 with corresponding densities
fi(·). Denote by si(vi), i = 1, 2 strictly monotonic equilibrium strategies, thus
they are invertible and s−1i (bi) = vi. The rest is the same as in the symmetric
scenario.
Proposition 3.6. If Fi(v) are continuous and strictly increasing on [v, v¯], the
quantile functions of valuations are nonparametrically identified:
qi(t) =
1
α
2
[ri(t)α−1
1∫
Gj(ri(t))
rj(tj)−αdtj + ri(t)−α−1
Gj(ri(t))∫
0
rj(tj)αdtj]
,
where t ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, 2, j = −i.
Proof: Given that the strategies of both players are strictly monotonic and the
valuations are independent, the expected payoff to bidder i when his true valuation
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is vi but he bids as if it was v can be written as:
E[ui(v)|vi, Fj(v)] = vi
[∫ b¯j
b
1
2
(
b
bj
)α
dGj(bj) +
∫ b
bj
(
1− 1
2
(
bj
b
)α)
dGj(bj)
]
− b =
= vi

v¯j∫
s−1j (si(v))
1
2
(
si(v)
sj(vj)
)α
dFj(vj) +
s−1j (si(v))∫
vj
(
1− 1
2
(
sj(vj)
si(v)
)α)
dFj(vj)
− si(v) =
= vi
1
2
si(v)
α
v¯j∫
s−1j (si(v))
sj(vj)
−αdFj(vj)− vi1
2
si(v)
−α
s−1j (si(v))∫
vj
sj(vj)
αdFj(vj)+
+viFj(s
−1
j (si(v)))− si(v),
since bi = si(vi) and Gi(b) = Pr(bi ≤ b) = Pr(vi ≤ s−1i (b)) = Fi(s−1i (b)) = Fi(v)
as si(v) is invertible.
Using the First order condition (differentiating with respect to v and substi-
tuting v = vi), we get:
∂E[ui]
∂v
= vi[
1
2
αsi(v)
α−1s′i(v)
v¯j∫
s−1j (si(v))
sj(vj)
−αdFj(vj)−
−1
2
si(v)
αsj(s
−1
j (si(v)))
−αfj(s−1j (si(v)))
∂
∂v
(s−1j (si(v)))+
+
1
2
αsi(v)
−α−1s′i(v)
s−1j (si(v))∫
vj
sj(vj)
αdFj(vj)−
−1
2
si(v)
−αsj(s−1j (si(v)))
αfj(s
−1
j (si(v)))
∂
∂v
(s−1j (si(v)))+
+fj(s
−1
j (si(v)))
∂
∂v
(s−1j (si(v)))]− s′i(v) = 0,
when v = vi.
From the differential equation above we obtain the following equation on the
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valuation and the strategy:
vi =
1
α
2
[si(vi)α−1
v¯j∫
s−1j (si(vi))
sj(vj)−αdFj(vj) + si(vi)−α−1
s−1j (si(vi))∫
vj
sj(vj)αdFj(vj)]
.
(3.4)
Let us now denote t = Fi(vi) and tj = Fj(vj), equivalently vi = qi(t) and vj =
qj(tj), where qi(·) and qj(·) are quantile functions of the distribution of valuations.
As a result of monotonicity of the strategies similar to the case with symmetric
bidders Gi(si(vi)) = Fi(vi), applying r
−1
i (·) to both sides of equality, where ri(·)
is quantile function of the bid distribution we get: si(vi) = ri(Fi(vi)) = ri(t) and
sj(vj) = rj(Fj(vj)) = rj(tj). Moreover, Fj(s
−1
j (si(vi))) = Gj(si(vi)) = Gj(ri(t)),
Fj(v¯j) = 1 and Fj(vj) = 0. Using these equalities and changing variables we can
rewrite the equation (3.4) above as:
qi(t) =
1
α
2
[ri(t)α−1
1∫
Gj(ri(t))
rj(tj)−αdtj + ri(t)−α−1
Gj(ri(t))∫
0
rj(tj)αdtj]
, (3.5)
where t ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, 2, j = −i. This proves the proposition.
3.3.2 Nonparametric Estimation
In this section, I propose nonparametric estimator of quantile functions of bidders’
valuations.
If we knew the quantile functions ri(·) as well as the distribution of bids Gi(·),
then we could use that to recover quantile functions of the bidders’ valuations qi(·).
Let L be the number of auctions, l is the l-th auction, {bil, i = 1, 2, l = 1, ..., L} are
the observations. As in case of the symmetric valuations ri(·) can be estimated
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from observed bids:
rˆi(t) = b
(dLte:L)
i ,
where b
(dse:L)
i is the s-th lowest order statistic out of L i.i.d. bids observations; d·e
is the ceiling function. In its turn Gi(·) can be estimated as:
Gˆi(b) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
1(bil ≤ b).
Thus, we can estimate the quantile function of valuations using the following
plug-in estimator:
qˆi(t) =
1
α
2
[rˆi(t)α−1
1∫
Gˆj(rˆi(t))
rˆj(tj)−αdtj + rˆi(t)−α−1
Gˆj(rˆi(t))∫
0
rˆj(tj)αdtj]
, (3.6)
where t ∈ (0, 1).
3.3.3 Monte Carlo Simulations
To analyze the performance of the estimator (3.6) I will run the Monte Carlo
Simulations.
Example 3.2. If the true quantile functions qi, i = 1, 2 of the bidder’s valuations
are
qi(t) =
1
α
2
[
kα−1i k
−α
j
1−α t
α−1 + 1
kj(1+α)
+ 1
kj(α−1)
] , t ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, 2.
Then there exist unique equilibrium bid functions s1(v) = k1F1(v) and s2(v) =
k2F2(v) for any k1 and k2.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Let’s consider L = 200 auctions with 2 bidders and 100 Monte Carlo replica-
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tions. Then the following figure presents the true quantile function, the mean, the
5% quantile, and the 95% quantile of the 100 estimates qˆ1(t) and qˆ2(t) for k1 = 5,
k2 = 6 and α = 2.
Figure 3.3: Monte Carlo results in case of asymmetric bidders
As we see the estimator works very well in this case, the only issue might occur
at the border since the quantile estimates are biased closed to the borders.
3.3.4 Representation in Terms of Types
The problem can be easily reformulated in terms of the types, where the type
characterizes how costly it is to raise a bid. Let ci, i = 1, 2 be the type of bidder
i. Expected payoff to bidder i in this case is given by:
E[ui|ci, Fj(c)] = E[Ψi(ci, c−i)|bi, ci, N, Fj(c)]− ci ∗ bi.
where ci =
1
vi
.
Then under the same conditions as before we can estimate the quantile func-
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tions of types:
qˆi(1− t) = α
2
[rˆi(t)
α−1
1∫
Gˆj(rˆi(t))
rˆj(tj)
−αdtj + rˆi(t)−α−1
Gˆj(rˆi(t))∫
0
rˆj(tj)
αdtj],
where t ∈ (0, 1).
3.4 Conclusion
In this work, I identified and estimated the incomplete information contest model
with serial contest success function with both symmetric and asymmetric bidders.
As a result, I recover the distribution of valuations or, alternatively, types from
the bid distribution. This model provides the framework that can be applied
to the variety of real-life scenarios such as litigation, research and development,
patent race, procurement of innovative good, research contests, sport, events, arms
race, rent-seeking activity, such as lobbying, as well as electoral competition. The
knowledge of the distribution of valuations or types allows the policymakers to
quantify the effect of different policy changes. This is a semiparametric version of
the model presented in Chapter 2, which can be applied in the case when the data
is sparse and some restrictions need to be put on the nonparametric structure.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof: Let us consider the more general case when bidders are asymmetric in a
sense that they have different distributions of the valuations: Fi(·), i = 1, 2 with
corresponding densities fi(·). Let us consider all assumptions required for the
Theorem 6 in Athey (2001) to hold.
1. fi(·) is density with respect to Lebesque measure, bounded and atomless.
2. Ui = Ψi(b1, b2)(vi − bi) + (1−Ψi(b1, b2))(−bi) can be written in the general
form considered in the paper.
3. Winner’s payoff vi − bi and loser’s payoff −bi are continuous in (vi, b) and
bounded as vi has a finite support [vi, v¯i] and the bidders won’t find it
profitable to bid more that the valuation.
4. Expected utility E[Ui] =
∫
Ψi(bi, sj(vj))fj(vj)dvj − bi is bounded and finite.
5. Single-crossing condition ∂
2Ui
∂vi∂bi
≥ 0 is satisfied as:
∂2Ui
∂vi∂bi
=
∂Ψi
∂bi
=
 12bj > 0, if bi ≤ bjbj
2b2i
> 0, if bi ≥ bj.
Thus all the assumptions of Theorem 6 in Athey (2001) are satisfied, hence there
exists a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in nondecreasing strategies.
Since the single-crossing property holds with strict inequality, this equilibrium
is actually in increasing strategies.
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3.5.2 Proof of Example 3.1
Proof: An equation (3.1) can be rewritten as
vi
α
2
[s(vi)
α−1
∫ v¯
vi
s(vj)
−αdF (vj) + s(vi)−α−1
∫ vi
v
s(vj)
αdF (vj)]− 1 = 0.
If we consider α 6= 1 and plug in s(v) = kF (v) the equation above becomes:
vi
α
2
[(kF (vi))
α−1
∫ v¯
vi
(kF (vj))
−αdF (vj)+
+(kF (vi))
−α−1
∫ vi
v
(kF (vj))
αdF (vj)]− 1 = 0.
Taking the integrals we get:
vi
α
2
1
k
[
F (vi)
α−1
(
1
1− α −
F (vi)
1−α
1− α
)
+ F (vi)
−α−1F (vi)
1+α
1 + α
]
− 1 = 0,
since F (v¯) = 1.
Collecting the terms we get:
vi
α
2k
[
F (vi)
α−1 1
1− α −
1
1− α +
1
1 + α
]
= 1.
In the end from here:
v =
1
α
2k(1−α)(F (v)
α−1 − 1) + α
2k(1+α)
,
or equivalently:
F (v) =
(
1 +
α− 1
α + 1
− α− 1
α
2k
v
) 1
α−1
, v ∈ [v, v¯], α 6= 1.
This proves the statement.
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3.5.3 Proof of Example 3.2
Proof: An equation (3.4) can be rewritten as
vi
α
2
[si(vi)
α−1
v¯j∫
s−1j (si(vi))
sj(vj)
−αdFj(vj)+
+si(vi)
−α−1
s−1j (si(vi))∫
vj
sj(vj)
αdFj(vj)]− 1 = 0.
If we consider α 6= 1 and plug in si(v) = kiFi(vi) the equation above becomes:
vi
α
2
[kα−1i Fi(vi)
α−1
v¯j∫
s−1j (kiFi(vi))
k−αj Fj(vj)
−αdFj(vj)+
+k−α−1i Fi(vi)
−α−1
s−1j (kiFi(vi))∫
vj
kαj Fj(vj)
αdFj(vj)]− 1 = 0.
Taking the integrals we get:
vi
α
2
[
kα−1i k
−α
j Fi(vi)
α−1
(
Fj(vj)
−α+1
−α + 1
)∣∣∣∣v¯j
s−1j (kiFi(vi))
+
+ k−α−1i k
α
j Fi(vi)
−α−1
(
Fj(vj)
α+1
α + 1
)∣∣∣∣s−1j (kiFi(vi))
vj
]
− 1 = 0.
Collecting the terms we get:
vi
α
2
[
kα−1i k
−α
j Fi(vi)
α−1 1
−α + 1 +
1
k2(α− 1) +
1
k2(α + 1)
]
− 1 = 0,
since Fj(s
−1
j (kiFi(vi))) =
kiFi(vi)
kj
.
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In the end from here:
vi =
1
α
2
[
kα−1i k
−α
j
1−α Fi(vi)
α−1 + 1
kj(1+α)
+ 1
kj(α−1)
] .
This proves the statement.
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